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A nuisance is an unreasonable interference with an owner’s right to use and enjoy 
her land. The tort of nuisance must be understood if we are to understand the nature, 
scope, and justification of private property rights. As the latter task is among the most 
important ones facing legal and political philosophers in a democratic society, such as 
ours, the former is crucial. Yet, we lack anything like a viable theory of nuisance law. The 
two most prominent—the economic view and the physical-invasion view—both fail, doc-
trinally and normatively. Things are so bad for nuisance that it has been called a ‘legal 
garbage can.’ We can do better, and we need to do better. Nuisance law protects owners 
by protecting their normative control, their capacity to determine what will happen on 
their land, and protects the core of their rights as owners of real property. Moreover, the 
scope of nuisance law helps fix the scope of this normative control; in other words, nui-
sance is partially determinative of the normative boundaries of ownership. Looking at 
nuisance helps reveal a distinctive understanding of private ownership and thus, reveal 
property rights’ place as partially constitutive of a just society. Looking at nuisance this 
way also helps us see why its core doctrines are what they are: the reasonability standard 
at the heart of nuisance, along with its core doctrines relating to locations, time, and the 
objectivity of nuisance all bring out a normatively attractive vision of nuisance law and, 
therefore, of private property rights. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What does the tort of nuisance do? To some, the answer seems to be, ‘who cares’? 
After all, nuisance is nothing more than a “legal garbage can” or an “impenetrable jun-
gle.”1 This is curious. Nuisance is usually said to “provide remedies for conduct that causes 
unreasonable harm to the use and enjoyment of land”2 or, in slightly different terms, to 
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William and Mary and Queen’s. Thanks also to Martin Barlow for outstanding research assistance. This research 
was supported in part by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, which support I hereby 
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 1. William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 399, 410 (1942); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser really did not like nuisance, evidently. 
 2. JOSEPH W. SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 333 (6th ed. 2014) (em-
phasis in original). 
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protect against “interferences with [the] right to use and enjoy real property.”3 A mo-
ment’s reflection on these formulas—Just what is it to use and enjoy land or to have that 
use and enjoyment interfered with? What is it to have a right to use and enjoy real prop-
erty?—shows that the tort of nuisance sits close to the heart of a justification of property 
rights, a topic of perennial and crucial concern. A complete theory of property would help 
explain what counts and what does not count as a nuisance, since if we knew what the 
right to use and enjoy real property was, we would be closer to knowing what counts as 
interfering with it. And conversely, a complete theory of nuisance would help explain the 
rights definitive of ownership of real property, since the scope of what does or does not 
count as an infringement of that right would help us see the scope of the right itself. 
So anyone concerned—as we all should be—with the nature and justification of pri-
vate ownership should be concerned with nuisance law. Contemporary thinking about nui-
sance law, unfortunately, is scandalously impoverished. Most law students, to the extent 
that they are exposed to nuisance at all, are exposed to it only through its walk-on role in 
the development of law and economics. Nuisance is used as the central example in both 
Coase’s “The Problem of Social Cost”4 and Calabresi and Melamed’s “Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral;”5 the two central works 
that define and set out the research program of contemporary law and economics. Radi-
cally simplified, these views tell us that nuisance is about ensuring the efficient use of land 
by comparing the use-values of land in order to ensure that low-value uses are not allowed 
to take place in such a way that make higher-value uses impossible, and thus, “avoid the 
more serious harm.”6 Given the prominence of these articles and the centrality of nuisance 
to them, a casual observer might be forgiven for thinking that the problem of nuisance has 
been solved, so to speak, and that we can (and should) understand it primarily as a tool for 
promoting or maximizing the efficient use of land (which maximization would on such 
views serve as the justification of private property). 
Notwithstanding the overwhelming prominence of these economic accounts, it is not 
hard to see why one might worry about them. Courts deciding nuisance cases tend not to 
engage in anything that looks like cost-benefit analysis, comparing of the seriousness of 
harms, or any other form of economic analysis, for that matter. Instead, they characteristi-
cally and distinctively reason in what some have argued is the paradigmatic form of rea-
soning appropriate to private law, namely by reference to the rights of the parties. Perhaps 
the most famous American nuisance case, Fontainebleau Hotel Corp v. Forty-Five 
Twenty-Five Inc.,7 displays this form of reasoning at its clearest. This case is about a com-
plaint made by the owner of the Eden Roc hotel in Miami beach, arguing that its neighbor, 
the Fontainebleau Hotel, was committing a nuisance by building up a new tower that 
would block sun rays from shining down on the Eden Roc’s pool area in the afternoon. In 
arguing this, Eden Roc relied on a Latin maxim—sic utere tuo ut non alienum laedas—
                                                          
 3. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK, & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURKSY, TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES 
AND REDRESS 846 (3d ed. 2012) (emphasis in original). 
 4.  See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 5. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 6. Coase, supra note , at 2. 
 7.  Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-five Twenty-five Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
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sometimes taken to be definitive of the tort of nuisance. The court rejected this argument, 
stating that: “This maxim does not mean that one must never use his own property in such 
a way as to do injury to his neighbor . . . . it means only that one must use his property so 
as not to injure the lawful rights of another.”8 A property owner, the court held, has no 
right to prevent his neighbor from building up even when such building up blocked the 
free flow of sunlight onto his property, and so the Fontainebleau was not wronging the 
Eden Roc, notwithstanding that (as we can assume) by blocking that sunlight the Fon-
tainebleau was surely causing the Eden Roc significant (economic) harm. 
This sort of rights-based reasoning, which is pervasive in nuisance law, makes the 
economic accounts offered by Coase and Calabresi and Melamed difficult to swallow, at 
least as attempts to help us understand nuisance law.9 Seeing this, other scholars, amongst 
whom Richard Epstein is most prominent, have attempted to explain nuisance law in more 
rights-based terms. These scholars tend to emphasize the close relationship between nui-
sance and trespass. Many cases of nuisance can, like trespass, be viewed as an “invasion” 
of the plaintiff’s land: in trespass the invading force is a person or physical object visible 
to the naked eye, whereas in nuisance, it is a smell, or smoke, or sound waves.10 In em-
phasizing the relationship between trespass and nuisance, these views help us see that a 
core feature of nuisance law is the connection between nuisance and ownership. (This is 
why, at the most naïve level, there are chapters about nuisance in both torts and property 
casebooks). As the House of Lords put it in one of the leading contemporary common-law 
decisions, nuisance is a “tort against land.”11 A nuisance wrongs a plaintiff not in some 
general way, but quite specifically in her capacity as owner of her land.12 While the Eden 
Roc certainly was harmed by the Fontainebleau’s new tower and the shade it cast on the 
Eden Roc’s pool, the owners of the Eden Roc were not affected in their capacity as owners: 
they were still able to control what happened on that land. (As we will see, this is a crucial 
element of a correct account of nuisance.) 
These physical invasion views, attractive as their attentiveness to the role of rights 
in nuisance is, have flaws of their own. Most importantly, they mistake a normative inquiry 
for an empirical one. On Epstein’s characterization, the basic inquiry in nuisance law is a 
physical inquiry, since nuisance for him is about an invasion, and “the term ‘invasion’ is 
                                                          
 8. Id. at 359.  
 9. There are, of course, much more sophisticated economic accounts, some of which attempt to account for 
the rights-based structure of nuisance law. The best and most prominent defender of such an account is Henry 
Smith. Below, I discuss his treatment of nuisance. See Henry Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of 
Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 966 (2004).  
 10. Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J.L.S. 49 (1979). 
See Simon Douglas, The Content of a Freehold: A ‘Right to Use’ Land? 7 MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 
(Nicholas Hopkins ed. 2013), for similar physical-invasion-based accounts; see also Simon Douglas & Ben 
McFarlane, Defining Property Rights (cited in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (James Penner 
& Henry Smith eds. 2014)); J.W. Neyers & Jordan Diacur, What (Is) A Nuisance? 90 CAN. B. REV. 213 (2011); 
Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and Natural Property Rights, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1409 (2010). 
 11. Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd., [1997] 1 A.C. 655, 702 (H.L.). 
 12. Christopher Essert, The Office of Ownership, 63 U. TORONTO L.J .418 (2013). Strictly speaking, tenants 
and other occupiers of land can make claims in nuisance. But these claims are, like all of their rights, derivative 
to and subservient to the claims of the owner. 
3
Essert: Nuisance and the Normative Boundaries of Ownership
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2016
ESSERT_FINAUTH_11-30 (DO NOT DELETE)  
88 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:85 
a description of a natural state of affairs which in itself serves as a justification for impos-
ing legal responsibility.”13 Epstein here wants to identify the scope of the rights of an 
owner of real property directly with the physical boundaries of that land. This identifica-
tion is wrong, for two reasons. One, the cases simply do not bear out Epstein’s account. 
Nuisances have been found in a wide variety of situations where it would be strained, at 
best, to say the defendant was invading the physical space of the plaintiff’s land.14 More-
over, as these cases help show, the physical account is normatively unattractive, just as 
Epstein’s well known and similarly physical account of personal injury torts is. The law 
of negligence is not simply the spelling out of the idea that one person cannot physical 
interfere with another person; it is rather the spelling out of the normative notion that per-
sons ought to relate to one another on fair terms of interaction, treating each other as free 
and equal.15 The point is the same in nuisance law: the law of nuisance is not about phys-
ical invasions, it is about the terms on which owners can relate to one another and to others, 
about what would be fair and reasonable for an owner to ask others to bear. Interestingly, 
in seeing this element of nuisance come to the fore through reflecting on the failure of 
Epstein’s account, we can see what Coase and his followers got right: nuisance needs to 
be understand as “a problem of a reciprocal nature” that involves both the plaintiff and the 
defendant.16 While Coase saw this, he thought, wrongly, that the reciprocal nature of the 
problem could be understood in terms of causation of harms, whereas, we will see, we 
must understand nuisance as a problem of the reciprocal nature of private ownership and 
of private property rights. Each of the two best-known kinds of attempts to understand 
nuisance law fails. We can do better. 
In what follows, I will present an account of nuisance that takes the best of both of 
these two well-known accounts and moves significantly beyond them in allowing us to see 
the centrality of the law of nuisance to a theory of property and, therefore, to any compre-
hensive account of a legal system in a just society. I will argue that nuisance law is about 
setting the terms of interaction that are appropriate for and proprietary to ownership. Nui-
sance is fundamentally a tort that protects ownership rights, but in so protecting them, it 
also partially constitutes them. Just what it is to be an owner of real property in the common 
law, in other words, depends on the content of the law of nuisance. Therefore, in order to 
have a successful justificatory account of private property rights—an account of what 
property rights are, how they are different from other private rights, and how (if at all) they 
can be morally justified—we need an account of the law of nuisance. Here, I provide such 
an account and tie it to the outlines of a novel and powerful account of private property 
rights.17 
I will argue that ownership is about providing for each person a normative sphere or 
normative refuge in which they are in charge of others, and that the provision of such a 
sphere is constitutive of certain valuable forms of living together, and therefore, of a just 
society. I will suggest that only such an account of ownership is capable of revealing the 
                                                          
 13. Epstein, supra note 10 at 53 (emphasis in original). 
 14. See cases discussed infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text. 
 15. See Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91 (1995). 
 16. Coase, supra note , at 2. 
 17. I defend the core of the account of property rights in land elsewhere: Christopher Essert, Property and 
Homelessness (forthcoming). 
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distinctive value of private property rights, the way in which they are not merely tools for 
the promotion of social welfare, but partially constitutive of a just society. Keeping in mind 
the reciprocal nature of such rights, their status as elements of a system of rights, will 
require us to see how the law of private nuisance works in setting what I will call the 
normative boundaries of property rights. Because property rights are justified in terms of 
the kind of normative control they give owners, the scope of this normative control must 
be understood in a way that allows for each owner to have fair and equal normative control 
over everyone else. Thus, the reasonability standard at the center of nuisance law is easily 
explained (and indeed required by the very idea of ownership): each owner can demand of 
every other that the other not use her property in a way that unreasonably prevents the one 
from using his. Thus, nuisance presents us with the common law’s working out of the 
scope of private ownership. 
Let me illustrate the basic idea of the account with the following (admittedly silly) 
example. In The Chicken Roaster, an episode of the television show Seinfeld, a Kenny 
Rogers Roasters restaurant opens directly across the street from Jerry and Kramer’s build-
ing.18 On top of the restaurant is a large neon sign in the shape of a chicken, which floods 
Kramer’s apartment, even through closed blinds, with a “huge red light.” Then, 
(KRAMER comes over, walks into the door jamb. Red light still blaring) 
JERRY: How’s life on the red planet?  (shuts door) 
KRAMER: It’s killing me, I can’t eat, I can’t sleep. All I can see is that giant red sun in the 
shape of a chicken. (gets some cereal from the cupboard and pours it in a big bowl) 
JERRY: Well, did you go down to the Kenny Rogers and complain? 
KRAMER: Ah, they gave me the heave ho. You know, I don’t think that Kenny Rogers has 
any idea what’s going on down there. 
(KRAMER takes a pitcher of red liquid from the fridge and pours it on his cereal.) 
JERRY: What are you doing? 
KRAMER: Getting some cereal 
JERRY: That, that’s tomato juice. 
(KRAMER takes a big spoonful of cereal with tomato juice! ) 
(Spits out cereal) 
KRAMER: That looked like milk to me! Jerry, my Rods and Cones are all screwed up!  
Alright, that’s it. I gotta move in with you Jerry. 
(KRAMER takes the bowl to the trash can and proceeds to spill the cereal and tomato juice 
all over JERRY’s wall in the area around the trash can.) 
Hilarity aside, how should we understand a potential claim in nuisance by Kramer 
against Kenny Rogers Roaster? On the economic account, we would want to weigh 
whether or not shutting down the restaurant would cost more or less than forcing Kramer 
to sleep in the glare of its lights; it is hard to say how this calculation would turn out, but 
if the restaurant were particularly popular, Kramer might be out of luck. On the physical-
invasion account, such as that offered by Epstein, as nothing is physically invading Kra-
mer’s property there could again be no nuisance. Something seems odd about this result: 
the lights shone by Kenny Rogers Roasters seem (to me at least) to be interfering in a 
direct and core way with Kramer’s reasonable right to use and enjoy his own property. It 
                                                          
 18. Seinfeld: The Chicken Roaster (NBC Television Broadcast, November 14, 1996). 
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seems that Rogers has, to use the words of a Canadian case, “cause[d] material discomfort 
and annoyance and render[ed] the plaintiff’s [i.e. Kramer’s] premises less fit for the ordi-
nary purposes of life . . . .”19 On the account I will offer, these facts embody an almost 
paradigmatic nuisance, in that they show a case in which one owner’s capacity to use his 
property as a kind of normative refuge, where he is free to decide against others how things 
will be, is unreasonably interfered with by another owner’s use of his land. It is as though 
one owner, Kenny Rogers Roasters, is extending the normative control that he has in his 
land so as to allow him to decide what will happen on the land of another owner, Kramer. 
This is a wrong. A finding that this is a nuisance would allow Kramer to protect the nor-
mative boundaries of his land. In so doing, it would also help us to see what ownership is 
about along the lines of the account I described above. 
I will argue for this account as follows. In Part 2, I will set out the two best-known 
accounts of nuisance—the law and economics account and the causal-invasion account—
and show how each fails. In Part 3, I will turn to presenting my own account. I will first 
(3.A) introduce the idea of ownership and its justification as I propose it to be best under-
stood. Then, (3.B) I will show how the reasonability standard that forms the doctrinal heart 
of nuisance fits into this account by showing how each owner’s rights and their normative 
boundaries are to be understood within a systematic realization of the idea of ownership. 
And I will continue this (in 3.c) by showing how the account uniquely explains why cases 
like the one I briefly discussed above constitute nuisances. In Part 4, I will turn to a more 
detailed review of some of the doctrinal features of the law of nuisance. Here, I will show 
how, on my account, the basic doctrines of the law of nuisance—its relation to nuisance 
(4.A), its objective standard (4.B), the role of the location of the nuisance (4.C), the fact 
that coming to nuisance is not a defense (4.D), and the injunctive remedy (4.E)—each re-
flect and vindicate the way I argue that nuisance is to be understood and related to the 
justification of private property rights. Part 5 briefly concludes. 
II. WHAT NUISANCE IS NOT ABOUT 
Most law students, if they learn about nuisance law at all, learn about it through a 
discussion of Coase’s famous article, “The Problem of Social Cost,” or Calabresi and Mel-
amed’s just-as-famous “Cathedral” article. That is a shame, because these articles, insight-
ful and important though they are, do not provide a good account of the law of nuisance. 
Other law students might get a more in-depth exposure to nuisance through a discussion 
of Epstein’s article or related “rights-based” views. Are these students better off? We 
might think so if they are drawn, through the Epstein article, to a realization of the implau-
sibility of the economic account of nuisance. But two wrongs do not make a right. Views 
like Epstein’s suffer from significant problems of their own. In this Part, I will discuss 
each of these views in turn and show how neither of them can successfully provide an 
account of nuisance law.20 
As I do so, I will assume a certain kind of methodological stance in regard to what 
it would be to ‘provide an account of nuisance law.’ Essentially, I will take on the mantle 
                                                          
 19. Appleby v. Erie Tobacco (1910), 22 O.L.R. 533, para. 9 (C.A.) (emphasis added). 
 20. This Article is about private nuisance. I say nothing about public nuisance, a different tort.  
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of private law formalism.21 This sort of way of understanding private law has a few im-
portant features. First, and most importantly, it takes seriously private law’s own internal 
point of view on itself by attempting to understand private law’s distinctive set of morally-
tinged concepts on their own terms. Courts in private law cases talk about plaintiffs’ rights, 
about defendants’ duties, about liability requiring a wrong by defendant, and so on. Private 
law formalism attempts to understand the law in these same terms; it attempts to think 
deeply and carefully about what it would be for there to be a private law in which it made 
sense to think about defendant’s liability being grounded on defendant’s wronging plain-
tiff, about plaintiffs having rights against defendants, and so on. There are lots and lots of 
detailed and difficult questions that are internal to this way of looking at private law, and 
I will touch on some in what follows. But what is most important is how this way of look-
ing at private law rejects the dominant Realist model according to which private law con-
cepts are mere weasel words,22 or stand-ins or smokescreens used to cover up some deeper 
explanation of the law in terms of welfare maximization or class conflict or naked politics. 
These so-called deeper explanations might have a certain attraction insofar as, because 
they require a kind of sophistication (in the sense of knowledge of some non-legal area of 
inquiry, like economics or sociology) to understand them, they seem sophisticated. But 
sophistication is not always a virtue. Perhaps here, the naive explanation is to be preferred. 
Courts talk about private law in terms of rights, duties, and wrongs. Might it be worthwhile 
to take that talk seriously and see where it leads us? I think so. But enough about method-
ology. As always, the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. 
A. Nuisance is not (just) about Harm 
“The Problem of Social Cost” is the most-cited law review article of all time.23 In 
light of that, it is by no means a surprise that its treatment of nuisance dominates the way 
that nuisance law is taught and understood. Given that dominance, I can summarize the 
central claim of the article’s treatment of nuisance very quickly. After glossing the facts 
of Sturges v. Bridgman,24 one of the best-known of the classic English nuisance cases, 
Coase writes: 
We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would inflict 
harm on A. The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or 
should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm.25 
As Coase’s article has been discussed in so much detail in the half-century since it 
was written, it might be strange to identify any particular aspect of the article as the central 
claim. But insofar as Coase’s discussion had influence over legal thinking about nuisance 
                                                          
 21. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995), for fuller discussion and defense of this way 
of looking at private law; see also JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE (2001); Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457 (2000); John Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism 
and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (2012); Henry E. Smith, On The Economy of Concepts in Property 
Law, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097 (2012). 
 22. This term is from GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
 23. Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
1483, 1489 (2012). 
 24. Sturges v. Bridgman, [1879] 11 Ch. D. 852 (U.K). 
 25. Coase supra, note 4, at 2. 
7
Essert: Nuisance and the Normative Boundaries of Ownership
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2016
ESSERT_FINAUTH_11-30 (DO NOT DELETE)  
92 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:85 
since it was written, these sentences bring out the content of that influence. Coase actually 
makes two claims: the first one is that the problem of nuisance is “reciprocal,” and the 
second one is that it is a problem of avoiding “the more serious harm.” The first one is, in 
a sense, correct. But, this is not the time to say why; I will explain that point below.26 It is 
the second that concerns me right now. In explaining nuisance as a problem about avoiding 
harm, Coase locates nuisance law centrally within the broadly utilitarian framework of 
law and economics. On that framework, when one neighbor (A) does something that af-
fects another (B), rendering some activities no longer possible for B, a decision about lia-
bility should, in the basic case, turn on whether A’s affecting activity is more or less val-
uable than the activities which B can no longer do: the problem is to avoid the more serious 
harm. 
Calabresi and Melamed’s article, which is almost as famous as Coase’s,27 rests ba-
sically on this same grounding. Again, this is a deep article with much of import to teach 
us. But, as with Coase’s article, the treatment of nuisance law is very simplistic and bears 
little or no relation to actual nuisance practice. The article’s main discussion of nuisance 
spells out in detail in various situations what the costs would be for giving a potential 
defendant an entitlement to commit the nuisance—to pollute.28 In effect, Calabresi and 
Melamed are enriching our understanding of what it means to avoid the more serious harm 
while remaining firmly ensconced within that framework. These are the basic, classic eco-
nomic accounts of nuisance. More developed accounts, of course, exist. On such accounts, 
the decision about whether or not A is to be held liable to B turns not only on the value of 
A’s and B’s activities (or, what is the same thing, the cost of A or B not acting), but also 
on the cost of enforcing such claims, the costs associated with each of A and B having to 
know about what is permitted and not permitted, and so on.29 
But the basic case is illustrative of the core idea in its insistence that the determina-
tion of liability is necessarily at base a question of costs and benefits. This is not a plausible 
way to provide an account of nuisance law. (Nor indeed is it a plausible way to provide an 
account of any aspect of private law, but that general point is not my concern.) This is for 
two related reasons. At an abstract level, a cost-benefit approach to understanding nuisance 
law fails to pay any heed at all to the language or concepts that nuisance law is replete 
with: nuisance is a “tort against land,”30 that makes actionable “interferences with [the] 
right to use and enjoy real property,”31 that protects “the right to use and enjoyment of 
land,”32 a nuisance is a wrong. And rather than assume automatically that these words and 
concepts are merely “weasel words,” we might at least try taking them at face value. John 
Goldberg makes the basic point clearly, and provides one pragmatic justification for doing 
so: 
                                                          
 26. See infra Part 3.A. 
 27. It is sixth on that same list. See Shapiro & Pearse, supra note 23, at 1489. 
 28. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1118. 
 29. Henry Smith’s account taking information costs into account is a good example. See Smith, supra note 
9. See infra note 68 and note 74, for criticism of Smith’s view. 
 30. Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd., [1997] 1 A.C. 655, 702 (H.L.). 
 31. GOLDBERG ET AL, supra note 3, at 846. 
 32. Donal Nolan, ‘A Tort Against Land’: Private Nuisance as a Property Tort 465 (cited in RIGHTS AND 
PRIVATE LAW (Donal Nolan & Andrew Roberston eds. 2012)). 
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As used in the law, words like ‘right,’ ‘duty,’ ‘power,’ ‘liability,’ ‘privilege,’ and ‘immunity’ 
have distinct (and often multiple) meanings. And there is much to be gained from approach-
ing them from a perspective that is charitable in the sense of not starting from the pre-
sumption that they are fictions, nonsense, or weasel words yet analytical. The point in 
doing so is not to celebrate nuance for its own sake. Rather, it is that being nuanced about 
legal concepts can help us think through practical problems.33 
It might be, as Goldberg goes on to note, that some or all of the concepts at play in 
nuisance law “may prove to be irredeemably confused or unnecessary,” and so apt for 
abandonment.34 But, we cannot begin to know that unless we examine these concepts on 
their own terms, and see if they can hang together in a way that helps us make sense of 
some part of the social world. Here, as elsewhere, we would do well to take Aristotle’s 
advice: 
We must set out what appears to be true about our subjects, and, having first raised the prob-
lems, thus display, if we can, all the views people hold about these ways of being affected, 
and, if not, the larger part of them, and the most authoritative; for if one can both resolves 
the difficult issues about a subject and leave people’s views on it undisturbed, it will have 
been clarified well enough.35 
The strength of this sort of methodology is shown by the vastly improved under-
standing it has given us of other areas of the law, in particular tort law.36 
The abstract point is echoed, in a way, by the law of nuisance itself. The leading 
cases in the law of nuisance are the leading cases, precisely because they show that nui-
sance is not simply about avoiding the more serious harm.37 Instead, these cases hold, 
again and again, that nuisance liability turns on the rights of the parties. The best-known 
judicial statement about the importance of rights in the law of nuisance is found in the 
famous Fontainebleau decision, where it was held that the defendant’s building up of a 
new hotel wing, which blocked the sun that shone on the plaintiff’s hotel pool, did not give 
rise to an action in nuisance, even though it undoubtedly harmed the plaintiff’s operations: 
This maxim [sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas] does not mean that one must never use his 
own property in such a way as to do any injury to his neighbor. It means only that one must 
use his property so as not to injure the lawful rights of another. [U]nder this maxim, it was 
stated that “it is well settled that a property owner may put his own property to any reasonable 
and lawful use, so long as he does not thereby deprive the adjoining landowner of any right 
of enjoyment of his property which is recognized and protected by law, and so long as his 
use is not such a one as the law will pronounce a nuisance.”38 
                                                          
 33. Goldberg, supra note 22, at 1652. 
 34. Id. 
 35. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VII.1 1145b5-10 (Sarah Broadie & Christopher Rowe, trans., Oxford 
Univ. Press 2002 ) (350 B.C.). 
 36. On the general point that an account of law needs to make sense of the law’s self-representation and its 
moral phraseology, as Holmes put it, the references cited in supra note 20. 
 37. Coase, supra note 4, at 15 (“’The reasoning employed by the courts in determining legal rights’ he wrote 
‘will often seem strange to an economist because many of the factors on which the decisions turn are, to an 
economist, irrelevant . . . . [S]ituations which are, from the economic point of view, identical [are] treated quite 
differently by the courts.’”).  
 38. Fontainebleau, supra note 7, at 359 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
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To similar effect, in the famous decision of the High Court of Australia, in Victoria 
Park Racing, which held that the defendant’s building of a tower on his land to look at and 
broadcast over the radio the horse races taking place on plaintiff’s land could not be a 
nuisance, one of the judges in the majority wrote, “It is essential to an action on the case 
in the nature of nuisance to prove that the acts complained of infringe a legal right of the 
plaintiff,” and a bit later on continued as follows: 
The plaintiff laid great stress on the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. The principle 
underlying the action on the case in the nature of nuisance is the same as that embodied in 
this maxim. It is essential for the application of this maxim that a wrongful act is committed 
and damage is sustained. ‘‘Alienum’ must be taken to mean “the rights of the neighbouring 
owner.”’39 
Given the insistence, in these leading cases, that nuisance law is about protecting the 
rights of owners, that simply harming your neighbor without infringing her rights will 
never amount to a nuisance, any harm-based view of tort law, such as law and economics, 
will be inadequate as an account of the law.40 
B. Nuisance is not about Invasions 
It is no secret that economic analysis of law is controversial, or, at least so far as 
most philosophically sophisticated lawyers are concerned, it simply cannot account in the 
right way for the core set of doctrinal concepts in private law. Indeed, for better or worse, 
a large majority of the private law theory work of the past generation has been dedicated 
to making these points. And indeed, the point is a well-known one, even in the law of 
nuisance. The other best-known treatment of nuisance law in American legal scholarship 
is surely Richard Epstein’s article, “Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian 
Constraints.” It was published in 1979.41 
Epstein starts off with the very basic thought that “at its core, [nuisance] protects the 
quiet possession and enjoyment of land,”42 and proceeds, in a manner consistent with the 
methodological suggestions I made in the last section, with an aim to developing an ac-
count of nuisance law on which cases should be decided based on (Epstein’s understanding 
of) the principle of corrective justice: “rendering to each person whatever redress is re-
quired because of the violation of his rights by another.”43 The question, of course, is what 
right or rights are violated by a nuisance. Some courts and texts describe nuisances as 
violations of “the right to use and enjoy” property, but at least on some readings, this is a 
problematic suggestion. Simon Douglas and Ben McFarlane have recently argued at length 
                                                          
 39. Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co. Inc. v. Taylor, (1937), 58 CLR 479 (Austl.) (citation 
omitted) (quoting GALE ON EASEMENTS 416-17 (8th ed. 1908)).  
 40. Certainly, some economists are not at all interested in providing an account of nuisance law in anything 
like the sense I am here. Their interest rather, is in the efficient resolution of disputes about neighbors and the 
effects of their activities on one another. Fair enough. They are not my target, except to the extent that by failing 
to even attempt to understand and take seriously the institution we currently have, they miss the chance to see 
the ways in which it reflects and helps to realize certain valuable ways of living with others. There is more to life 
than efficiency.  
 41. I was going to write that Epstein’s article is old, but I have a certain interest in believing that something’s 
being created in 1979 does not make it old. 
 42. Epstein, supra note 10, at 49. 
 43. Id. at 50. 
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 52 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol52/iss1/4
ESSERT_FINAUTH_11-30 (DO NOT DELETE)  
2016] NUISANCE AND THE NORMATIVE BOUNDARIES 95 
that in private law, there is no right to use and enjoy one’s property, since there are a great 
many cases in which a defendant has quite clearly interfered with a plaintiff’s use and 
enjoyment of property, but no liability has followed.44 Taking their cue from Hunter v. 
Canary Wharf, the leading House of Lords decision on nuisance law, Douglas and McFar-
lane claim instead that nuisance is very close indeed to trespass; they argue that a nuisance 
is (like a trespass) an infringement of the right that others not enter or cause anything to 
enter the three-dimensional area of space defined by one’s land. The idea has a certain 
intuitive appeal, since “in the standard nuisance case, such as those involving fumes, 
smoke, noise, smells, etc., it is possible to say that there is something emanating onto—
and hence crossing the physical boundary of—the claimant’s land.”45 Thus, the idea is 
that a nuisance is like a kind of trespass. Instead of coming onto your land uninvited, I 
(indirectly) send something onto it, like smoke or noise. In Hunter, Lord Goff seemed to 
endorse a physical-invasion view when he refused to find liability for the defendant’s tow-
ers’ interfering with the plaintiffs’ television signals, in part because nuisance liability 
“will generally arise from something emanating from the defendant’s land.”46 
Epstein shares this view. He draws a very close analogy between the right to property 
and the right to one’s body, and claims that both are to be understood in physical terms: 
[O]wnership of things is subject to the same entitlements and limitations as the ownership 
of the person. With land, for example, boundary lines have the same hard-edged quality as 
foul lines in baseball, while the ad coelum rule defines (within limits) the interest in the 
subsoil below and the airspace above.47 
That is, to own land, in Epstein’s view, is to simply and to clearly control what hap-
pens within a particular three dimensional space.48An owner’s rights to her land are thus 
infringed by incursions into this three-dimensional space. Some such incursions—those in 
which the invading object is a person or something visible to the naked eye—are tres-
passes. Others—those that “fall short of trespasses but which still interfere in the use and 
enjoyment of land”—are nuisances.49 As ownership is understood by Epstein in physical 
terms, so too is nuisance: 
The term “invasion” is not used as a disguised synonym for the legal conclusion that the 
defendant’s activities are of the sort to which tortious liability should attach, where liability 
is at bottom imposed for other, possibly economic, reasons. Instead, the term “invasion” is 
a description of a natural state of affairs which in itself serves as a justification for imposing 
legal responsibility.50 
                                                          
 44. Douglas & McFarlane, supra note 10. 
 45. Douglas, supra note 10, at 372. 
 46. Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd., [1997] 1 A.C. 655, 686 (H.L.). 
 47. Epstein, supra note 10, at 53. 
 48.  See e.g. HENRY E. SMITH & THOMAS W. MERRILL, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO US LAW: 
PROPERTY 32 (2010). It is sometimes called the “column of space” defined by the two-dimensional area of the 
land on the earth’s surface, although geometrical pedants will insist that the shape is not a column. So far as I 
know, there is no special name for the shape, which is closest to a spherical sector (of a sphere with infinite 
volume, or perhaps a volume defined by the highest usable portion of the atmosphere), but a spherical sector is 
defined by a circular shape whereas the volume under question is defined by the irregular two-dimensional shape 
of the so-called parcel of land. 
 49. Epstein, supra note 10, at 53. 
 50. Id. (italics in original) (underlining added). 
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It is important to be clear about what Epstein is saying here. On this account of 
nuisance, the core of the wrong lies in one person acting in such a way as to lead to a 
physical invasion into the three-dimensional space that, on his account, defines another’s 
property. Epstein emphasizes above that this is a matter of a “natural state of affairs,”51 
which is to say that, at least in the first instance, we can understand whether or not a nui-
sance has taken place strictly by looking at the empirical state of the world: we ask simply, 
did this or that particle enter onto this or that land. 
Now, there is an obvious intuitive appeal to this way of looking at nuisance law. 
Epstein’s model does seem to match, at least on first glance, many of the paradigmatic 
nuisances—smoke, smells—which do involve something emanating from the defendant’s 
land onto the land (that is, into the three-dimensional space) of the plaintiff. As I noted 
above, in English law, this point was endorsed by Lord Goff in his judgment in Hunter: 
Indeed, for an action in private nuisance to lie in respect of interference with the plaintiff’s 
enjoyment of his land, it will generally arise from something emanating from the defendant’s 
land. Such an emanation may take many forms–noise, dirt, fumes, a noxious smell, vibra-
tions, and suchlike.52 
One can see why this would be an attractive way to look at nuisance law. As Henry 
Smith has noted, it is simple and cost-effective, in that it allows potential defendants to 
know, simply and easily, what kinds of activities would make them liable to plaintiffs in 
nuisance. And Simon Douglas has argued that this sort of conception of nuisance liability 
sets an attractive balance as between the rights of owners of different properties. 
These advantages notwithstanding, this sort of view is wrong and must be rejected. 
There are several reasons. First, as Jules Coleman and Arthur Ripstein, drawing on Ste-
phen Perry’s work, showed conclusively in the parallel negligence context, Epstein’s 
causal-strict-liability account of tort is fundamentally wrongheaded.53 It presumes, with-
out arguing for or defending, an implausible and morally quite unappealing conception of 
the nature of private law rights. Indeed, the law of nuisance bears this out. Why? We might 
say that it is because property is not physics:54 “[I]t is elementary that a nuisance can be 
created without a physical intrusion.”55 The case books are rife with cases in which liabil-
ity for nuisance does not rest on any kind of emanation by defendant onto plaintiffs’ land. 
These cases include liability for removal of support;56for obstructing access to land;57 for 
creating a (well-founded and substantial) fear that a neighbor’s property would collapse 
onto one’s own;58 for the listing of an owner’s phone number in a way that lead to an 
inordinate number of unwanted phone calls;59 for creating a fear of contagion;60 for the 
                                                          
 51. Id. 
 52. Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd., [1997] 1 A.C. 655, 686 (H.L.). 
 53. Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 15.  
 54. I owe this phrase to Ernie Weinrib. 
 55. Seagraves v. Portland City Temple, 522 P.2d 893, 895 (Or. 1974). 
 56. Holbeck Hall Hotel Ltd. v. Scarborough Borough Council, [2000] 2 All ER 705 (C.A.). 
 57. J. Lyons & Sons v. Wilkins (No. 2), [1899] 1 Ch. 255 (U.K.); Guppys (Bridport) Ltd. V. Brookling, 
[1984] 1 H.L.R. 1 (U.K.). 
 58. Birmingham Dev. Co. Ltd. v. Tyler, [2008] EWCA Civ. 859. Strictly speaking, this is in obiter. 
 59. Macca v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Nw., 495 P.2d 1193 (Or .1972). 
 60. Stotler v. Rochelle, 83 Kan. 86, 109 P. 788 (Kan. 1910). 
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sight of sex workers entering and exiting a brothel;61 for the sight of a large collection of 
junk cars;62 and for building an unsightly spite fence.63 These cases could be multiplied. 
Taken as a whole, these cases are not plausibly analyzed as cases in which a defend-
ant’s action is wrong because it infringes a right of a plaintiff that can be understood in 
spatial or physical terms.64 We can see this most clearly by considering the attempt to do 
just that with respect to one such case. Recall Lord Goff’s thought that nuisance liability 
“will generally arise from something emanating from the defendant’s land.”65 He also 
noted that this rule could be relaxed “in relatively rare” cases, such as Thompson-Schwab 
v. Costaki, in which the sight of sex-workers was held to be a nuisance.66 Douglas and 
McFarlane attempt to squeeze even this case into the causal invasion view: 
Interestingly, Lord Goff describes the nuisance as consisting of the ‘sight of prostitutes and 
their clients entering and leaving neighbouring premises:’ this focus on sight, which neces-
sarily requires the passing of light rays over the claimant’s land, means even that rare case 
can in fact be reconciled to the general model of nuisance, in which a defendant will only be 
liable if he is responsible from something cross the boundary of claimant’s land.67 
Well, one would have thought that this is close to a reductio ad absurdum: if light 
rays are a nuisance in this case, why not in every case? 
It is clear that every owner of real property is bombarded, at all times, and from all 
directions, with light rays. But, it would be absurd to think that these “emanations” could 
ground nuisance liability. Instead, cases in which nuisance liability has been found for the 
effects of light have clearly stated the ground of such liability in quite different terms. 
Consider, for example, Thompson-Schwab to Bank of New Zealand v. Greenwood,68 
which Douglas and McFarlane mention in an attempt to bolster the Emanations Ap-
proach’s interpretation of nuisance-by-light cases. There, the defendant was found liable 
in nuisance for the light that was reflected off of its glass veranda and into the plaintiff’s 
offices. But, the judgment makes clear that such liability does not turn on anything like a 
physical invasion of the plaintiff’s property. Rather, the light was a nuisance because it 
caused “considerable discomfort and inconvenience” and “irritation and complaint” to 
those within plaintiff’s offices.69 Another well-known case of nuisance by light is The 
Shelburne v. Crossan Corp.70 There, the defendant owner of an apartment building had 
erected a large illuminated advertisement on the top of the building and the light from the 
sign was bright enough to make sleeping in a subset of the rooms inside the plaintiff’s 
                                                          
 61. Thompson-Schwab v. Costaki, [1956] 1 W.L.R. 335 (U.K.). 
 62. Foley v. Harris, 286 S.E. 2d 186 (Va. 1982).  
 63. Apple Hill Farms Development, LLP v. Price, 342 Wis. 2d 162, 816 N.W. 2d 914 (Wis App. 2012). 
 64. As I have said, a parallel here might be the attempt by some to try to understand tort law in terms solely 
of factual causation; but normative questions about responsibility need normative answers. See Andrew Botterell 
& Christopher Essert, Normativity, Fairness, and the Problem of Factual Uncertainty, 47 Osgoode Hall L.J. 663 
(2009). 
 65. Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd., [1997] 1 A.C. 655, 684-86 (H.L.). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Douglas & McFarlane, supra note 10, at 232. 
 68. Bank of New Zealand v. Greenwood, [1984] 1 NZLR 525. 
 69. Id. at 527. 
 70. The Shelburne v. Crossan Corp, 122 A. 749 (N.J. Ch. 1923). 
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neighbouring hotel impossible. Again, liability was found without any reference to any-
thing like an invasion or an emanation, and instead on the grounds that the defendant’s 
sign “materially interfere[d] with the ordinary comfort physically of human existence” on 
plaintiff’s property.71 
Now we can return to Costaki. The sight of the sex workers, the court held, “consti-
tute[d] a sensible interference with the comfortable and convenient enjoyment of his resi-
dence where live with him his wife, his son and his servants.”72 It is of course possible, 
with Lord Goff, to treat Costaki as in some way anomalous, and understand liability here 
to rest on a different ground that liability in more common cases of nuisance by smoke, 
smells, sounds, etc. But surely it would be preferable to have a unified account of nuisance, 
on which liability in Costaki, in the nuisance-by-light cases, in the common emanations 
cases, and in the other non-emanations cases I mentioned above could all be explained in 
the same way. Such an account is available; in fact, it is the account that the law itself 
gives us. Look more closely at the passage cited just above. Notwithstanding the somewhat 
antiquated flavor of the reasoning in Costaki,73 we might note in particular the reference 
to the plaintiff’s family. This suggests that we can see the case as being about the capacity 
of owners of real property to control the behavior of others in at least some ways in order 
to, we might say, ‘shut out’ some parts of the world and have a place of normative refuge, 
safety, and so on. On a conception of ownership like this, the tort of nuisance acts to ensure 
that this normative refuge is protected and, in so doing, helps also to constitute its scope. 
I defend this conception in the next sections. 
Before I do, I should briefly mention what Epstein himself says about this problem. 
Recall that his paper’s subtitle is “Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints.” Ech-
oing Lord Goff, in a way, Epstein recognizes that it is simply not possible to account for 
the entire law of nuisance on the basis of the empirical or causal account I outlined above, 
or at least not in a remotely normatively plausible way. He then goes on to characterize a 
large part of the law of nuisance in terms of the utilitarian constraints on the basic correc-
tive justice framework. For someone who, like Epstein, believes in the role and importance 
of rights in private law, this is a stunning concession, which amounts to something very 
close to giving up the entire game. Why bother thinking about rights at all, if in so doing 
we need to account for a great deal of the law74 in terms of non-right-based considerations. 
Before we characterize the law in these terms, we might instead search for a single, better 
account of the nature of the right in nuisance that would allow us to see all of the law as a 
reflection of this underlying right. I will embark on such a search in the remainder of this 
article. 
                                                          
 71. Id. at 750. 
 72. Thompson-Schwab v. Costaki, [1956] 1 W.L.R. 335, 654 (U.K.). 
 73. See ALLAN BEEVER, THE LAW OF PRIVATE NUISANCE 22 n.30 (2013). 
 74. Epstein needs utilitarianism to explain the principle of ‘live and let live’ from Bamford v. Turnley (1860) 
3 B. & S. 62, which is traditionally thought to be amongst the core doctrines of the law, along with the similarly 
prominent locality rule and the rule about harms traceable to the sensitivity of plaintiff as not grounding liability. 
See Epstein, supra note 10, at 82-94. Basically, he cannot explain anything non-trespass-like about nuisance 
without utilitarianism. This makes sense, as his physical conception of the right is really in its absolute best light 
a conception of the right in trespass. 
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III. WHAT NUISANCE IS ABOUT 
We have seen so far that the two best-known accounts of nuisance are failures.75 
The economic account, as exemplified by Coase’s brief treatment, fails to see how nui-
sance is not about balancing of harms but is about rights, whereas the putative rights-based 
account of the sort offered by Epstein focuses wrongly on the idea that a nuisance can be 
understood in terms of a natural, empirical event—a physical invasion of a physical 
space—and so is both implausible and unable to account for a core important part of nui-
sance law. Interestingly, though, each of these two views has something going for it. The 
latter has the basic idea of nuisance correct, namely that, as a part of private law, nuisance 
is to be understood in terms of the rights of the parties. (Indeed, this is where Epstein 
begins; he goes wrong because he has a bad account of a right.) What Coase has right, I 
have mentioned above briefly, but now want to focus on. 
I said that, in discussing nuisance in his famous article, Coase landed on a crucial 
feature of the tort when he pointed to what he called ‘the reciprocal nature of the problem’: 
The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has to 
be decided is: how should we restrain A?  But this is wrong. We are dealing with a problem 
of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A. The real question 
that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A?  
The problem is to avoid the more serious harm.76 
While Coase’s own conception of reciprocity–reciprocity of harms–will not work, 
recognizing the reciprocal nature of the problem is crucial to solving it. 
The crucial point is that nuisance is about the reciprocity of rights, and reciprocity 
of rights is not reciprocity of harms. It is better understood in terms of the possibility of 
rendering consistent and systematic a right of owners such that all owners have a set of 
rights that allows them to interact with one another (and with non-owners) on fair terms. 
The thought would be that to be an owner is to have a kind of interpersonal normative 
control, to have the right to determine whether or not others may act in certain ways.77 But 
reciprocity of private law rights requires that the normative control that each owner has 
must be the same as the normative control that every other owner has. Thus, the rights of 
ownership limit themselves as part of a system; no owner can reasonably claim to have a 
right that her neighbor not act in some way unless at the same time she admits that her 
neighbor also has the right that she not act in that same way. This is not a feature of land, 
or of harms, or of causation understood empirically or extralegally. It is a feature of any 
system of rights. This means that we need to understand the systematic nature of the law 
of nuisance primarily in normative terms. The question about whether or not a defendant’s 
                                                          
 75. Henry Smith sees this too. His account of nuisance in terms of information costs and governance vs 
exclusion tries to solve the problem by saying how some cases are about exclusion – as Epstein thinks—while 
others are about cost-benefit analysis—as Coase thinks. But rather than getting the best of both worlds Smith 
gets the worst, since each of these views is, as I showed above, problematic not just in its failure to account for 
some of the cases but also on its own terms. Moreover, Smith is forced to say that not all nuisance cases are at 
base about the same kind of wrong, whereas my account shows a unity in the law. See Smith, supra note 9. 
 76. Coase, supra note 4, at 2. 
 77. Note that the control, being interpersonal and normative, is not control over states of affairs but funda-
mentally a kind of capacity to determine whether or not it would be permissible or justifiable for others to perform 
certain actions. 
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action constitutes an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of a plaintiff’s 
land, then, is a question about whether or not a system of property rights can admit of a 
systematic realization of the kind of interpersonal normative control that such a finding 
would entail. 
“A nuisance is an unreasonable interference with another’s right to use and enjoy 
her property.”78 Or as the House of Lords put it, nuisance is a “tort against land.”79 This 
means that it protects a right paradigmatically held by owners as owners—its role in a 
system of property lies in its helping to fix the scope of the interpersonal normative control 
that owners have as owners, or as I will say, the normative boundaries of their ownership. 
Since these boundaries are part of a system, they must be fixed in a way that we can un-
derstand as setting fair terms of interaction between owners and others. Adding to this, the 
central role played by the law’s reasonability standard suggests that the kinds of actions 
that have been found to constitute a nuisance should be conceivable as forming a unified 
set whose membership is grounded on the fact that these actions (or their effects) unrea-
sonably interfere with whatever it is that makes up the core right that ownership protects. 
Thus, the content of the law of nuisance, that is, the content of the fair terms of interaction 
appropriate to a system of ownership, partially constitutes the very content of the right of 
ownership itself. An abstract account of that right would, at the same time, help us under-
stand why the various forms of nuisance count as unreasonable interferences with it. That 
is, if nuisance sets terms of interaction between owners and others appropriate to a rightful 
or justifiable conception of ownership, a theory of nuisance depends, in no small part, on 
a theory of ownership that can make sense of the content of nuisance.80 
A. Towards a Theory of Property 
A complete presentation of a theory of ownership and its justification will need to 
take place in another forum. But a brief abstract discussion will be helpful here. To begin, 
we can divide justifications of property into two classes by asking the following type of 
question: taking as given the private-right-based structure of property law—the fact that 
to be an owner is paradigmatically to have the right that others not act in some ways—we 
ask whether or not this structure is designed to serve a goal that can be understood (and 
perhaps even achieved) independently of it. Most theories of property answer that it can: 
that property rights are a tool or instrument to be used to serve some interest81 that exists 
                                                          
 78. JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C ZIPURSKY, OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO US LAW: TORTS 241 
(2010). 
 79. Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd., [1997] 1 A.C. 655, 702 (H.L.); see also Nolan, supra note 32, for clear 
discussion. To be clear, standing to bring a claim in nuisance is available not only for owners but also for others 
in possession of property, such as tenants. Whatever rights these others have are obviously derivative of the 
owner’s interest, so I leave this point to one side. 
 80. So, I disagree in the strongest possible terms with Allan Beever, who denies that a theory of nuisance 
depends on a theory of ownership. See BEEVER, supra note 73, at 24. One way of expressing the problems with 
the two views considered in the previous Part of this article is that each fails because its account of nuisance rests 
on an incorrect account of ownership. 
 81. The two most prominent property theorists working today, Henry Smith and James Penner, both endorse 
a view of this sort, on which property rights are a tool to serve and protect the interest we have in the use of 
things. This is not the space to argue against this view at length. In my Property in Licenses and the Law of 
Things, 59 MCGILL L. J. 559 (2013), I suggested one reason to worry about it–that its conception of a “thing,” is 
either too narrow to explain all of property or else problematically circular. Arthur Ripstein provides an argument 
along the lines of this paragraph and the next in his Possession and Use in Penner and Smith, supra note 10. The 
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independently of it, or some general advantage that is conceivable in non-property terms.82 
But such justifications of property inevitably give rise to a ‘gap’ between the institution 
and its justification.83 If property is to serve the general advantage (however conceived) 
but has a rule—or right—based form, how are we to understand those difficult cases, easy 
to find in the law,84 where the general advantage that justifies seems to diverge from what 
is justified?  (We can put this worry in narrower terms more directly applicable to the law 
of nuisance by asking why do courts insist on the sort of rights-based reasoning that Coase 
found “strange,” with its focus on the sorts of considerations that Coase thought “irrele-
vant”?)85 
We might return to our question and choose the other path: we might ask for a jus-
tification of property that justifies it as a “unique and indispensable [moral] tool”86 re-
quired to solve a problem that only it can solve.87 To be an owner, in abstract terms, is to 
have the right to determine how others act in some defined set of circumstances. To justify 
the institution of property (or ownership) in the terms outlined in the previous paragraph 
would be to show that this kind of interpersonal normative control achieves a kind of value 
(or perhaps serves a kind of interest) that can be achieved (or served) in no other way; it 
would be to show that the right constitutes rather than produces the value.88 When it comes 
                                                          
interest-in-use view makes both Penner and Smith’s own treatments of nuisance problematic. Smith’s discussion 
of nuisance is a sophisticated law and economics version which aims to do a better job than Coase or Calabresi 
and Melamed’s accounts do of explaining the rights-based form that nuisance cases take. But Smith is committed 
to a view on which property rights are tools to the promotion of some other value—either the interest in use, in 
his mature work, or perhaps a more basic utilitarianism, in the nuisance piece—and so suffer all the flaws of that 
sort of two-stage view. See id. Penner’s view gets a lot right—including a very clear discussion of the flaws of a 
physical-invasion-based view like Epstein’s—but again fails in that it rests ultimately on Penner’s flawed theory 
of property rights. See J.E. Penner, Nuisance and the Character of the Neighbourhood 5 J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1993). 
 82. This is usually taken to be Hume’s view. He thought property just made us generally better off: DAVID 
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 494 (L.A. Selby-Bigge, P. H. Nidditch eds., 2nd ed. 1978). In a more 
attenuated way, it was also Locke’s (he thought, among other things, that property was necessary to allow man-
kind to take advantage of the bounty of earth as God had given it. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT, II, 27-28 (Peter Laslett ed., 1994); see A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 
236-264 (1992), for more on this interpretation of Locke; see ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, II.5 1263b3-14 (W. D. Ross 
trans., Clarendon Press 1957) (350 B.C.), for Aristotle’s thought that property was necessary for generosity. Kant 
had the other sort of view on which property solves the problem of not having property. See IMMANUEL KANT, 
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor trans. 1996). 
 83. Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Means and Ends in American Property 
Law’ 94 CORNELL L .REV. 959 (2009). 
 84. See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes Inc., 209 Wis. 2d 605, 563 N.W.2d 154 (Sup. Ct. 1997); Goulding 
v. Cook, 661 N.E. 2d 1322 (1996); Athwal v. Pania Estates Ltd. [1981] 11 C.E.L.R. 17 (B.C. S.C.); Vincent v. 
Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). 
 85. Coase, supra note 4, at 15. 
 86. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism, 117 PHIL. REV. 481, 
508 (2008). 
 87. In the opening sentences of the Nicomachean Ethics, which is one of the two or three most important 
works every written in moral and political philosophy, Aristotle draws a distinction between two ways something 
can be for the sake of something else: ‘But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others 
are products apart from the activities that produce them.’ (ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, I.1 1094a3-4 
(W.D. Ross trans., Clarendon Press 1957) (350 B.C.). My thought here is that, while most take property to be a 
productive end of some good identified independently of property we might instead take it to be constitutive of 
some end that cannot be separated from it. See Christopher Essert, How Law Matters in Why Law Matters, 12 
JERUSALEM REV. L. STUDIES 1 (2015), for a discussion of the distinction in slightly more general terms and as 
applied to theories of the nature of law. 
 88. This seems like a tall task, especially in the light of the fact that there are many quite different property 
institutions. See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011). That is, that formal definition 
of property includes—and is definitely meant to include—not only property in land but also property in chattels, 
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to real property, to be an owner is to have the right to determine how others act with respect 
to some piece of land (or more precisely some three dimensional space).89But as we saw 
in the last section, the law of nuisance makes clear that this ‘with respect to’ needs to be 
understood in normative rather than factual terms. That is, the rights of owners are simply 
not rights to exclude from or prevent emanations into some physical space; rather, they are 
rights that (at least sometimes) provide owners with the ability to control others’ actions 
even when they have no physical impact on that space. Why? 
It is a good thing that we can have rights against others that give us interpersonal 
normative control over others’ actions with respect to parts of the external world. It is a 
good thing that we are capable of extending our normative spheres beyond ourselves by 
becoming owners. Were there to be no such thing as property, the rights that we would 
have against others would be limited to our rights in our persons (and perhaps those rights 
we could obtain through voluntary undertakings). Thus, we would be lacking any norma-
tive protection against others except that which we have in ourselves; we would have no-
where to hide but in our own selves. Property provides a kind of additional protection; it 
provides us with a sphere in which we can determine how others act and so a sphere in 
which we are sovereign. 
Private ownership of land is only justifiable, if it is justifiable at all, because it is 
valuable for us to be able to control others to have a right that they not act in certain ways 
defined roughly by reference to location, so that there can be the possibility of our being 
in charge of a location, so that we can experience a degree of sovereignty there and realize 
the value of a place of refuge in a way that cannot be realized except by being in charge 
of it in the sense of having a right over it. This is approximately the idea that underlies a 
certain set of currently popular views in political philosophy, including the notion of Re-
publican freedom as non-domination, and the Kantian notion of freedom as independ-
ence.90 In particular, the thought here is that, unless I am in charge of some location, then 
everywhere and always, I am in a location where others are in charge of me. And if others 
are in charge of where I can be, they are also in charge of what I can do, as everything that 
needs to be done needs to be done somewhere.91 Thus, in order to ensure that we as sepa-
rate moral agents are not left to the mercy of others or left in a position in which we have 
no space of our own except the ‘space’ inside ourselves, we must create an institution of 
                                                          
certain kinds of intellectual property, some kinds of government-issued licenses, and other kinds of intangible 
property such as the right of publicity, as any plausible definition of property must. Essert, supra note 87. We 
might think—and I say this tentatively—that the justification of ownership in each of these situations needs to 
be taken separately, although in each case keeping in mind that what is to be justified is the form of interpersonal 
normative control (the in rem right of ownership) itself, and that avoiding the gap problem requires providing a 
normative interest or value that can only be served by that kind of normative relationship in that instance. Such 
a general justification (or better, set of justifications) of property is outside my scope here. 
 89. Anchor Brewhouse Devs. Ltd v. Berkley House (Docklands Devs.) Ltd., (1987) 2 EGLR 173. 
 90. See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM (1997) or QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM (1998); 
ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM (2009). 
 91. Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom 39 UCLA L. REV. 295 (1991). 
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property in land.92 On this conception of property, we might say that owners have a nor-
mative refuge constituted by their property.93 
B. Nuisance and Ownership 
What does all this have to do with the law of nuisance? Once we recognize that the 
value of property in land is in the kind of normative refuge it provides to its holder—the 
value of being able to have the right that others not interfere with a certain space because 
of the kind of normative security that provides—we see that there is no a priori reason to 
think that this right will precisely protect some physical space against physical invasions 
understood empirically. Rather, the normative boundaries of the right will be set by nor-
mative considerations grounded on the value that justifies the right. In other words, own-
ers’ rights provide just that degree of interpersonal normative control that allows them to 
genuinely have the normative refuge the value of which justifies their right. This tells us 
why nuisance must include a reasonability standard: each owner acting on her own prop-
erty cannot demand of other owners that they not act in ways which she would not at the 
same time allow them to demand of her. The reasonability standard sets fair terms of in-
teraction by recognizing the proper degree of control that owners need to have in order for 
their property to genuinely serve as a normative refuge. Thus, the law of nuisance sets the 
normative boundaries of the right of ownership by reference to the boundaries of the jus-
tification of the right in terms of a normative refuge. 
To illustrate this last point, consider Sturges v. Bridgeman.94 Above, I quoted Coase 
on the reciprocal nature of nuisance. Immediately following that passage I cited, Coase 
specifically mentions Sturges: 
[Consider] the case of a confectioner the noise and vibrations from whose machinery dis-
turbed a doctor in his work. To avoid harming the doctor would inflict harm on the confec-
tioner. The problem posed by this case was essentially whether it was worth while, as a result 
of restricting the methods of production which could be used by the confectioner, to secure 
more doctoring at the cost of a reduced supply of confectionery products.95 
As I have already said, Coase gets something right here and something wrong. He is 
wrong, as the law of nuisance makes quite clear, to think that what matters is a comparison 
of harms. Harm is a monadic category, and nuisance law is about the correlatively struc-
tured interaction between the parties. 
                                                          
 92. I develop an account of property that tracks the preceding few paragraphs in my Property and Homeless-
ness (forthcoming). 
 93. That is why a decision like Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v Episcopal Community Services in Ari-
zona 148, Ariz. 1, 712 P.2d 914 (1985), leaves such a bad taste in one’s mouth. In this case, the court held that a 
soup kitchen created a nuisance by attracting homeless clients, who ‘frequently trespassed onto residents’ yards, 
sometimes urinating, defecating, drinking, and littering on the [plaintiff] residents’ property. A few broke into 
storage areas and unoccupied homes, and some asked residents for handouts.’ The idea that ownership of real 
property provides a kind of refuge from the world by giving owners a set of rights to control the actions of others, 
even sometimes extending (as in Thompson-Schwab) to controlling what one can see from one’s home, is morally 
plausible only if this same kind of refuge is made available to everyone. The idea of a give and take or live and 
let live requires, it seems embarrassing to have to point out, that everyone has something to give and somewhere 
to live. See also Waldron, supra note 91. 
 94. Sturges v. Bridgman, [1879] 11 Ch. D. 852 (U.K). 
 95. Coase, supra note 4, at 2. 
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But Coase is right to see that there is a sense in which this is a zero-sum dispute. 
Either the dentist wins, in which case he—and any other owner similarly situated—has the 
right that others not cause him to experience noise at or above the level in question. Or the 
confectioner wins, in which case he—and any other owner similarly situated—has no duty 
not to make noise at or above that level. The law of nuisance frames the dispute in such a 
way as to make it clear that there is obviously a level of noise about which plaintiffs such 
as the dentist cannot complain. The rule of live and let live means precisely that owners 
cannot expect to have complete control over others’ action;96  thus, this rule is at the heart 
of nuisance law.97 Set the level of noise too low, that is, such that owners have an ex-
tremely expansive right to prevent others from making noise at all, and we will have given 
all owners the ability to determine how others act far beyond what is needed in order to 
realize the value of the interpersonal normative control that justifies the institution of prop-
erty. Set the level too high, on the other hand, and the rights of owners will be too restric-
tive to be of any good, such that owners would have no rights to prevent others from mak-
ing even noises that make occupation of the land impossible, denying the possibility of the 
owner having a normative refuge in the land and effectively effacing owner’s claim to 
have any rights over the land at all, or as Weinrib put it, “negating the plaintiff’s status as 
owner.”98 
Therefore, the same rule of live and let live means that there is a level of noise—the 
level at which “[b]asic life activities, such as sleeping, resting, relaxing, working, studying, 
reading, or doing anything that required concentration, were impossible due to the loud 
noise . . . .”99—above which defendant would be creating a nuisance.100 Between extremes 
lies the standard. Plaintiff owners have the right that others not make unreasonable noise. 
This is the standard that the law sets in recognizing that the rights of owners need to be 
systematically realized: each owner must have the same right as others not make noise 
above a certain level. The reasonableness standard is the law’s abstract articulation of that 
                                                          
 96.  See Bamford v. Turnley (1860) 3 B. & S. 62 (“It seems to me that the principle . . . is this, namely, that 
those acts necessary for the common and ordinary use and occupation of land and houses may be done, if con-
veniently done, without submitting those who do them to an action . . . [t]he convenience of such a rule may be 
indicated by calling it a rule of give and take, live and let live.”). See BEEVER, supra note 73, for an elaboration 
of the rule in rights-based terms.  
 97. The fact that Epstein is forced to explain this core rule in terms of a utilitarian constraint on his putatively 
corrective-justice based model of nuisance law shows the central failure of his account. See supra note 67. 
 98. WEINRIB, supra note 21, at 191. 
 99. Whaley v. Park City Mun. Corp., 190 P.3d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). But note that this was just the 
allegation made by the plaintiffs whose claim was denied. 
 100. I am thinking something like this: “Most of the plaintiffs testified that their normal routine changes on 
fireworks Fridays. They must close their windows and turn off their air conditioners to keep out noise, smoke 
and smell. The noise, which some compared to being at a firing range, makes it difficult to carry on conversations. 
One plaintiff testified that he goes into his basement to escape the noise; others leave their homes altogether. 
Another plaintiff, who works between 2 a.m. and 7:30 a.m., misses her usual night’s sleep, between 8 p.m. and 
1 a.m., on fireworks nights. The reverberations from the fireworks make some plaintiffs feel that their homes are 
trembling. They experience the booms as earth shattering and like claps of thunder. Several plaintiffs have emo-
tional reactions to the fireworks, feeling anxious, angry and frustrated. They also reported negative reactions 
from their family pets. One plaintiff spends fireworks evenings soothing her young daughter, born in July, 2000, 
who awakens frightened and crying from the explosions.” Esposito v. New Britain Baseball Club, Inc., 49 Conn. 
Supp. 509, 512-13 (Conn. Supp. 2005). 
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level.101 Here, as elsewhere, the articulation of the standard through the ideas of reasona-
bility and the reasonable owner captures the correlativity and systematicity of the law, by 
asking owners to accept the same level of noise on their property which they expect others 
to accept as a result of their own activities. 
In Greenwood, the nuisance-by-reflected-sunlight case, the court made exactly this 
point when it rejected defendant’s argument that plaintiff could abate the nuisance by in-
stalling darker blinds, since “to expect these plaintiffs to provide sun barriers . . . as part 
of the give and take of business in the central city would in reality be to require them to 
accept total responsibility for elimination of the plaintiff’s nuisance . . . the law will not 
require that.”102 (In simple terms we could say: the very idea of my having a right against 
you implies that I have this right in light of some objective features of my situation and 
thus, presupposes that anyone else in that same situation must have the same right; thus, 
the rights need to be systematically defined by and limited against each other.) A Canadian 
court captured the idea very well in holding that a smell caused by a tobacco factory was 
a nuisance, because it “cause[d] material discomfort and annoyance and render[ed] the 
plaintiff’s premises less fit for the ordinary purposes of life . . . .”103 
It is important to see here just how deep the correlativity of the reasonability standard 
of nuisance law runs, on the kind of account of nuisance and property I am offering here. 
The reasonability inquiry is not into the reasonability of the defendant’s action taken alone 
or the reasonability of the plaintiff’s loss taken alone, but rather into the reasonability of 
the systematic arrangement of rights as between the parties that either result would en-
tail.104 
A prominent tort law textbook put the point clearly in the middle of the twentieth 
century: 
“Reasonable” as used in the law of nuisance must be distinguished from its use elsewhere in 
the law of tort and especially as it is used in negligence actions . . . But here ‘reasonable’ 
means something more than merely ‘taking proper care.’ It signified what is legally right 
between the parties, taking into account all the circumstances of the case . . . .105 
                                                          
 101. And it is not at all clear that we can—or should—try to make the standard more precise when we talk 
about it in these abstract terms. The reasonability standard must be applied through an exercise of practical judg-
ment and what it requires cannot be specified in the absence of a particular context to which it may or may not 
apply. See Martin Stone, On the Idea of Private Law, 9 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 235, 242 (1996). 
 102. Bank of New Zealand v. Greenwood, [1984] 1 NZLR 534. 
 103. Appleby v. Erie Tobacco (1910), 22 O.L.R. 533, para. 9 (C.A.) (emphasis added). 
 104. As the court put the point in Rogers v. Elliot,15 N.E. 768, 771 (Mass. 1888), “the right to make a noise 
for a proper purpose must be measured in reference to the degree of annoyance which others may be reasonably 
required to submit to.” Incidentally, this phrasing helps to see why, even though I have mostly talked about 
nuisances constituted by the defendant’s actions, there can liability in nuisance for so-called continuing nui-
sances, situations in which a defendant is liable for preventing something from happening to plaintiff’s land. 
Since nuisance is fundamentally about the terms of interaction between plaintiff and defendant, understood in 
normative terms, liability can be found when a defendant has failed to take actions that plaintiff has a reasonable 
claim to demand of him such as trimming overhanging tree branches, keeping brick and stone walls in good 
enough repair that their parts not fall onto plaintiff’s land, and so on. In the language of one well-known English 
case, liability here depends obtains when defendant “fails to take any reasonable steps to bring [the interference 
with plaintiff’s property] to an end . . . .” See Sedleigh-Denfield v. O’Callaghan, [1940] A.C. 880, 880. The 
thoroughly normative core of my account of nuisance makes cases such as this easy to explain. 
 105. WINFIELD, TEXT-BOOK ON THE LAW OF TORT 448 (2nd ed. 1950) (emphasis added) (cited in Russell 
Transp. Ltd. v. The Ontario Malleable Iron Co. Ltd., [1952] O.R. 621, para. 33 (Can.). 
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Nuisance is neither about the doing of defendant understood monadically, nor about 
the suffering of plaintiff understood monadically. Rather, it is about the doing of defendant 
only in relation to the suffering of plaintiff and about the suffering of plaintiff only in 
relation to the doing of defendant.106 What matters is whether defendant’s conduct was 
“reasonable as regards” plaintiff,107 which is just another way of asking whether plaintiff 
has a right against defendant that defendant not engage in that very conduct. The analysis 
is shot through with correlative normativity. 
One way to illustrate this is by seeing that the case law reveals that whether or not a 
certain kind of interference constitutes a nuisance depends on what activity of defendant 
is causing that interference. The leading House of Lords decision on nuisance, Hunter v. 
Canary Wharf, famously holds that plaintiff’s loss of television reception caused by de-
fendant’s building up on his land was not a nuisance, since to hold would be to grant 
defendant a right that others not build up on their land, and “[a]s a general rule, a man is 
entitled to build on his own land.”108 The possibility of building up is quite close indeed 
to the core value of having property in land, since in effect its incidental to being able to 
decide where you are on your property, so a decision which gave one owner a right that 
others not build up would be very hard to square with the possibility of ownership of real 
property at all. But compare the result in Hunter with an earlier Ontario case, Nor-Video 
Services v. Ontario Hydro. Here, radiation from new high-voltage electrical lines installed 
by the defendant electrical company blocked plaintiffs’ television reception, and this was 
held to be a nuisance because “proprietary interests entitled to protection were invaded by 
Hydro’s action in constructing high power electrical installations . . . .”109 Nor-Video is 
sometimes taken to be in conflict with Hunter,110 but, notably, the House of Lords in 
Hunter did not see things this way.111 The key to reconciling the cases lies in recognizing 
that the reasonability inquiry must be one which makes reference both to the plaintiff’s 
right that others not interfere with her property and the nature of the duty that such a right 
imposes on defendants:112 the two cases together stand for the proposition that a land-
owner does not have a general right that others not block her television signals by building 
on their land while at the same time having a right that others not perform some particular 
actions which interfere with a signal where a normal building would not. In fact, an Illinois 
case on this same issue makes the point quite clearly: “The principal issue in this case is 
whether defendant has a legal right to use the air space above its property subject only to 
                                                          
 106. Here, as elsewhere, the language of doing and suffering is Aristotle’s. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN 
ETHICS, V. See also Martin Stone, The Significance of Doing and Suffering, PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF 
TORTS 135 (Gerald J. Postema ed. 2001)). 
 107. Nor-Video Services v. Ontario Hydro (1978), 19 O.R. (2d) 107 (H.C.J.), para 5. 
 108. Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd., [1997] 1 A.C. 655, 685 (H.L.). 
 109. Nor-Video Services, 19 O.R. (2d) at para. 37. 
 110. Neyers & Diacur, supra note 10. WEINRIB, supra note 21, thinks it is in conflict with Fontainebleau, 
which amounts to the same thing. 
 111. Lord Goff discussed the case (at 684-5) in noting that plaintiff’s claim did not fail merely, because it was 
a claim based on access to television (“That interference with such an amenity might in appropriate circumstances 
be protected by the law of nuisance has been recognised in Canada, in Nor-Video Services Ltd. v. Ontario Hydro. 
However, as I see the present case, there is a more formidable obstacle to this claim. This is that the complaint 
rests simply upon the presence of the defendants’ building on’·land in the neighbourhood as causing the relevant 
interference.”). 
 112. See Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159, 161 (1849), for a general statement of the idea. The requirement that 
a plaintiff’s harm not be grounded on the plaintiff’s peculiar sensitivity reflects this same point.  
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legislative limitation, or stated conversely, whether an individual or class of individuals 
has the right to limit the use of such property on the basis that interference with television 
reception constitutes an actionable nuisance.”113 The answer to the question is, it depends: 
individuals do not have any general right to limit the use of others’ property on that basis, 
but they do (or at least may) have a more limited right with respect to some uses, like high-
voltage power lines.114 Thus, to determine whether or not defendant is liable in nuisance 
is not simply about comparing the costs or benefits of the two activities. Rather, it is a 
fundamentally correlative inquiry into the question of whether defendant, in performing 
this activity with these effects on plaintiff’s land, is unreasonably interfering with plain-
tiff’s control over her own property. And in performing this inquiry into reasonability, the 
court is also determining what it means to own property, as I will explain in the next sec-
tion. 
C. Setting the Normative Boundaries of Ownership 
Return to the cases in which a nuisance has been found absent any physical invasion 
of a plaintiff’s land. The basic thought is the following: once we accept that ownership is 
about interpersonal normative control and that nuisance is about protection of ownership, 
there is no a priori reason to think that the protection offered by nuisance should be un-
derstood empirically in terms of physical emanations. Things like removal of support, ob-
structing access to land, creating a (well-founded and substantial) fear that a neighbor’s 
property would collapse onto one’s own, the listing of an owner’s phone number in a way 
that lead to an inordinate number of unwanted phone calls, creating a fear of contagion, 
the sight of sex workers entering and exiting a brothel, the sight of a large collection of 
junk cars, and building an unsightly spite fence are all, at least arguably and keeping in 
mind the reasonableness standard, things that could, “render property less fit for the ordi-
nary purposes of life,” things that could render empty plaintiff’s entitlement to treat her 
land as a normative refuge.115 
Note the ‘arguably.’ Perhaps some of these cases are not correctly decided, but 
whether they are or not is beside the current point. Let me explain. Suppose I am right that 
                                                          
 113. Hoogasian v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 287 N.E. 2d 677, 678 (Ill. 1972). 
 114. What should we say about nuisance claims grounded in plaintiff’s demand that defendant not build up 
when such building up would interfere with plaintiff’s solar panels? See, famously, Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 
223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982). On the analysis offered here, the plaintiff could only succeed in such a claim were 
she to show that her normative interest in controlling others’ conduct vis-a-vis her property required that they 
not interfere with solar access. (By contrast, the overall social benefit of solar power just cannot be the right kind 
of consideration to ground such a claim.) The court in Prah analogized the solar power access claim to some 
claims about nuisance and surface water, and there may be a way to draw on this comparison to help understand 
these types of cases. See infra notes 150-52; see also Michael G. McQuillen, Note, Prah v. Maretti: Solar Rights 
and Private Nuisance Law 16 J. MARSHALL. L. REV. 435 (1983), for a careful discussion of Prah, 
 115. If the Coasean cost-benefit view of nuisance failed to explain the idea that nuisance is a tort against land 
because it failed to explain that nuisance is about rights, the physical invasion view championed by Epstein fails, 
because it misunderstands the relevant concept of land. Here, as in all of private law, the relevant concept must 
be normative, not empirical. My land is not merely defined by a three-dimensional space so that all and only 
physical interferences into that space will be wrongs. Rather, my land is a normative idea that is defined by 
reference to the three-dimensional space but will include also incorporeal hereditaments (see infra, note 124) 
and, crucially, some control over actions that occur outside the three-dimensional space if they unreasonably 
interfere with my ability to determine how things will be as between myself and others with regards to that space. 
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the core of ownership is the normative control that owners have over others. Suppose fur-
ther that the scope of this normative control needs to be developed, through the law of 
nuisance, by determining what is required in order to realize that normative control and, 
given that such realization must be systematic, what constitutes reasonable terms of inter-
action between plaintiff and defendant. In the light of those suppositions, it is no surprise 
that we will have (reasonable) disagreements about which actions count as infringements 
of owners’ rights. Perhaps granting owners the right that their neighbors not open a brothel 
gives them too much normative control. Or perhaps not. As one English judge recognized, 
these are “difficult questions.”116 
Simon Douglas, who, recall, supports a view like Epstein’s, helpfully illustrates my 
point here when, having conceded that there are some cases of nuisance that do not involve 
physical boundary-crossings, he tries to defend his on normative (rather than legal or con-
ceptual) grounds. (Epstein, too, has a kind of a normative defense of his own view, im-
plausible though it may be.) Douglas seems to think that the only alternative would be a 
view on which owners had a general right that their use of their property not be interfered 
with. He rejects this option, because it would “prove very onerous on others,” while on his 
sort of view on which owner has no such right, the owner “will not, in the normal course 
of things, be overly prejudiced.”117 In other words, Douglas here makes a normative ar-
gument for a particular account of the boundaries of the rights of owners—he is doing 
precisely what I claim nuisance law must do.118 I think the substance of his argument is 
wrong, in particular, because he fails to see that there are more than two options, and that 
nuisance provides owners neither with the very limited right that others not allow physical 
emanations onto their property nor with the close-to-unlimited right that others not act in 
any way that interferes with owner’s use, but rather with a much more limited right that 
others not act in ways that would be permitted by unreasonable terms of interaction. But 
even if I am wrong and Douglas is right about the substantive scope of the reasonable 
terms of interaction—that is, if the normative boundaries of ownership track the physical 
boundaries of land—that would only be because such physical control turns out to be the 
kind of normative control that is required by the value of ownership, and the overall picture 
of the relationship between ownership and nuisance that I am advocating would be pre-
served.119 
I prefer my own account.120 In both cases, the court’s reasoning seems to rest its 
conclusion that defendant has committed a wrong on the idea that plaintiff ought to be able 
to be secure from these sorts of interferences; this is consistent with my thought that plain-
tiff’s right in her property is justified by her interest in having a kind of normative refuge 
there. To this effect, consider Hubbard v. Pitt, an English case in which the court, in con-
sidering whether or not to grant a preliminary injunction in a nuisance case, allows for the 
                                                          
 116. Miller v. Jackson, [1977] 1 Q.B. 966, 961 (U.K.).  
 117. Douglas, supra note 10, at 376. 
 118. See Avihay Dorfman, Private Ownership 16 LEGAL THEORY 1, 32 (2010), for a different version of the 
general claim that normative argument is required to set the boundaries of ownership.  
 119. Perhaps a more explicitly Kantian account of nuisance such as that offered in WEINRIB, supra note 21 or 
in Arthur Ripstein, Tort Law in A Liberal State 1 J. TORT L. ARTICLE 3, 26-28 (2007) could be understood to be 
making this kind of claim. 
 120. I would, wouldn’t I?  
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possibility that defendant’s picketing might constitute a nuisance if defendant’s picketing 
amounted to “besetting” plaintiff with a view to compelling him to act in some way.121 
Here again, the idea might be that plaintiff’s interest in having a zone of normative refuge 
inside his property grounds a right that defendant’s not “beset” him in this way. I think the 
‘decency’ cases are to the same effect. In addition to Costaki, there is Laws v. Flor-
inplace,122 another interim injunction case in which the question of whether defendant’s 
pornography shop was a nuisance was held to be a triable issue. There the Court suggested 
that the “open use” of the defendant’s shop might itself materially interfere with plaintiffs’ 
use of their residences. To the same effect, is Mark v. State Department of Fish and Wild-
life about a nude beach located on a defendants’ land, where patrons’ “intrusive nudity and 
sexual activity impair [plaintiffs’] use and enjoyment of their land”123 and so, but for some 
procedural issues that do not concern us, “would thus constitute a private nuisance for 
which they could seek damages or an injunction.”124 More generally, the Court noted that 
“[u]ndesired exposure to sexual activity, such as the presence of a neighboring house of 
prostitution, is one of the traditional grounds for finding” a nuisance.125 This last idea 
again brings home the thought that the interpersonal normative control that is basic to the 
rights of owners is associated with a conception of property as a normative refuge: I should 
be able to be in my home and not exposed to at least some things taking place outside of 
it.126 
IV. HOW NUISANCE WORKS 
OK. We have made the pudding—by seeing how nuisance is an inquiry into the 
normative boundaries of ownership, and the kinds of control that owners reasonably ought 
to have over others—now it is time to eat it. In this section, I will show how the account 
of nuisance I have offered here, on which nuisances are infringements of the right of own-
ers to control the actions of others, where this right is justified by owner’s normative in-
terest in having that very control, and where liability depends on the reasonable terms of 
interaction between owner and others, keeping in mind the systematic nature of owners’ 
rights, can help to explain the basic doctrinal contours of nuisance law. This will vindicate 
my methodological starting point: by seeing how my account of nuisance law can actually 
                                                          
 121. Hubbard v. Pitt, [1976] Q.B. 142. 
 122. Laws v. Florinplace, [1981] 1 All ER 659 (Ch. D).  
 123. Mark v. State Dept. of Fish & Wildlife, 974 P.2d 716, 720 (Or. Ct. App. 1999). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 719. 
 126. Again, the precise substantive contours of the law matter less than the abstract idea. The crucial point to 
keep in mind is that at least some of these cases make it very difficult to understand why we would think that the 
the normative boundaries of owners’ property—that is, the scope of their normative control—should directly 
mirror its physical boundaries. Imagine that your next door neighbor engages in some set of behaviors which do 
not involve any emanation onto your land but which make you uncomfortable using your garden. (Imagine that 
he engages, in open view, in sexual activity or in the use of his own garden as a latrine; or imagine that he 
constantly tries to make slightly off-color jokes.) It seems to me that such a neighbor plausibly could be said to 
be making your own property ‘less fit for the ordinary purposes of life,’ or creating a ‘sensible interference with 
the comfortable and convenient enjoyment’ of your property. Obviously tests of reasonability are crucial here, 
and a finding of liability could not rest on merely subjective distaste. But if one’s home is really to be treated as 
one’s home, it seems as though one ought to have a right not to need to close the blinds, look the other way, or 
otherwise have to bear the (non-physical) effects of some actions of this sort. Thanks to David Estlund and John 
Goldberg for discussion of these sorts of cases. 
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account for nuisance law, we will see how the basic doctrines of nuisance hang together 
to form a part of a coherent and plausible understanding of ownership. I will discuss five 
issues: the relationship between trespass and nuisance (in Part A), the objective standard 
for nuisance liability (in Part B), the role of a local standard in determinations of liability 
(in Part C), the idea that a plaintiff’s having ‘come to the nuisance’ is not a defense (in 
Part D), and the correct understanding of nuisance remedies (in Part E). 
A. Trespass and Nuisance 
One question that might have formed in the reader’s mind by this point is this: what 
about trespass?  Supposing that the ownership is justified on the grounds that it provides a 
valuable kind of interpersonal normative control, one might wonder how the tort of tres-
pass fits in, how it relates to the tort of nuisance, or more generally to the conception of 
property I have offered here. In this section, I address these questions. I show that trespass 
protects the same interest as nuisance does, the normative interest in having control over 
others. Simply put, trespass protects owners’ right to the kind of normative refuge I de-
scribed above by giving them the right that others not physically enter the space that de-
fines their right. As I noted above, this is true in those cases where such an action would 
be to the general benefit without harming the owner, and even in those cases where it 
would arguably be to the benefit of the owner herself. And as I suggested above, we might 
seek to understand the tort of trespass to have these features not because it is a tool to 
protect some other interests understandable in the absence of property, but instead as a 
special tool that is partly constitutive of the very value embodied by its form. 
Trespass protects owners’ interpersonal normative control with respect to what they 
own. A form of wronging that looks like trespass is a necessary concomitant of all forms 
of property: trespass to land, intellectual property torts, and the various kinds of intangible 
property such as property in hot news, the right of publicity or confidential information, 
and so on.127 But here, I argue that such a tort is not enough; taking seriously the justifi-
cation of property in terms of the value of the normative control that it provides requires 
us to recognize the need for a wrong like nuisance, a tort that ensures that owners’ norma-
tive control is protected appropriately. So, trespass and nuisance are very similar torts in-
deed.128 On the most extreme version of this thought, the division between trespass and 
nuisance is simply an historical accident;129 perhaps, this is why the common law has 
never definitively drawn a line between trespass and nuisance. We need not be extreme, 
though. In fact, there does seem to me to be at least a plausible way to draw the distinction 
                                                          
 127. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes Inc., 209 Wis. 2d 605, 563 N.W.2d 154 (Sup. Ct. 1997), INS v AP, 248 
U.S. 215 (1918), Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers (No 2), [1990] 1 AC 109 (HL), Presley v. Russen, 
513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981), Midler v. Ford Motor Company, 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); see also the 
discussion of ‘Intellectual Property Torts’ in GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 78, at 250. 
 128. See Smith, supra note 9, at 1024. Henry Smith makes what seems to be the same point when he writes 
“Nuisance rests on a foundation of exclusion, whether this is labeled trespass or nuisance.”  
 129. Notably, there is nothing like a division between trespass and nuisance when it comes to the wrongs 
associated with intellectual property. While in both cases, there is something that looks like trespass—mechanical 
reproduction of a copyrighted work or unlicensed working of a patented invention—and something that looks 
like nuisance in that it depends on a kind of reasonability standard—production of something substantially similar 
to a copyrighted work or of an invention which is equivalent in its pith and substance to a patented invention—
in both areas of law there is just one wrong, infringement. 
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that is consistent with much of the law and which provides some further insights into the 
nature of real property. 
But in what might seem like a digression, I want to start with prescriptive easements. 
The classic case of a prescriptive easement—a right of way formed by repeated use of a 
particular path130—arises through repeated trespass. But if both trespass and nuisance in-
volve essentially the same form of wrongdoing—performing some action that plaintiff 
owner has a right that defendant not perform—then one would expect that a prescriptive 
easement could arise through a nuisance carried on for the requisite period. And so it is: a 
good part of Sturges v. Bridgman, of course, deals with whether or not the defendant might 
escape liability for nuisance on the ground that the noise had been carried on for so long 
that an easement was created.131 It turned out he had not, but the possibility was clearly 
within the contemplation of the court. And this was recently confirmed by the UK Supreme 
Court; “the right to carry on an activity which results in noise, or the right to emit a noise, 
which would otherwise cause an actionable nuisance, is capable of being an easement.”132 
Thus, at least so far as the law of easements is concerned, both trespass and nuisance have 
roughly the same structure, namely that defendant (in this case the dominant tenement 
holder) is acting in some way with respect to plaintiff’s land that plaintiff has a right that 
he does not. And in both cases, if this activity continues long enough (and the other con-
ditions are met), a prescriptive easement comes into existence.133 
Turning now to the substantive question about the relation between trespass and nui-
sance, the first thing to note is that the law itself has never been at all clearly settled on the 
distinction between nuisance and trespass. By this I mean not merely that there are disa-
greements over whether a particular action was a trespass or a nuisance.134 Rather, I mean 
that there has been persistent disagreement at the more abstract level about what consid-
erations could even be relevant to determining whether or not a particular case is a trespass 
or a nuisance case.135 In a helpful article, Thomas Merrill isolates the two most prominent 
                                                          
 130. See 1043 Bloor Inc. v. 1714104 Ontario Inc., [2013] ONCA 91, 114 O.R. (3d). 
 131. Sturges v. Bridgman, [1879] 11 Ch. D. 852, 862 (U.K). 
 132. Lawrence v. Fen. Tigers Ltd. [2014] UKSC 13, para 31., [2014] AC 822, 833. To the same effect, see 
Bliss v. Hall (1838) 4 Bing NC 183; Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 183-84, 376 P.2d 100 (1962): 
“At common law, one could obtain a prescriptive right to impose an unreasonable noise upon one’s neighbor, 
and hence an easement for a nuisance;” JOHN MURPHY, THE LAW OF NUISANCE 105-06 (2010). 
 133. The connection between nuisance and easements runs the other way, too. An interference with an ease-
ment can be a nuisance: MURPHY, supra note 132. Why? If we just say, as some do, that nuisance protects rights 
to land and in connection with land, without spelling out any substantive notion of what such a connection might 
be (see e.g. Neyers & Diacur, supra note 10, at 219-20), we have version of the same problem we had with the 
physical invasion based view: why think that the normative boundaries of ownership are set in this apparently 
arbitrary way? Instead, we might search for a coherent explanation of this protection. To show that, we would 
begin, I think, with the idea that for an easement to be valid it must improve the dominant freehold qua freehold, 
or in the words of In Re Ellenborough Park, [1956] Ch 131, 174 (CA), an easement must relate to the “use of the 
house as house, namely, as a place in which the householder and his family live and make their home.” In other 
words, the same sort of interest in normative control that justifies property also justifies the ways in which the 
rights of ownership can be extended through the use of easements. Given this restriction on what sorts of ease-
ments there can be it makes total sense to see that an interference with an easement can constitute a nuisance. If 
we wanted to say that ownership constitutes an office—which we do! See Essert, supra note 12—then the thought 
here would be that the terms of the office, its normative boundaries, are set by its purpose. 
 134. Although of course there are those. See Mann v Saulnier, (1959) 19 DLR (2d) 130 (NBSC). 
 135. See MURPHY, supra note 132, 17-20, for some discussion; see also Nolan, supra note 32, 481-4; P.H. 
Winfield, Nuisance as a Tort [1932] CAMBRIDGE L.J. 189, 202-03; A.H. Hudson, Trespass or Nuisance 23 
MODERN L. REV. 188, 189 (1960); Thomas Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property 
27
Essert: Nuisance and the Normative Boundaries of Ownership
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2016
ESSERT_FINAUTH_11-30 (DO NOT DELETE)  
112 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:85 
accounts of the difference between trespass and nuisance to appear in the case law: on the 
first, they differ in that trespasses are direct, while nuisances are indirect; on the second, 
they differ in that trespasses are visible to the naked eye, while nuisances are not.136 Mer-
rill’s own argument is that the latter is superior to the former on information cost 
grounds—it is what he called “mechanical,” which means generally cheaper and easier to 
apply as compared to the directness test. 
I have no reason to doubt Merrill’s argument on its own terms. But I think we might 
do a better job of understanding the relationship between trespass and nuisance than his 
account allows us to. The worry begins by noting that one traditional legal difference be-
tween trespass and nuisance is the presence of the reasonability standard in the latter which 
the former lacks. And this is hard to square with Merrill’s test; why would we think that a 
defendant who emits particles that are 0.06mm in diameter onto a plaintiff’s land should 
be strictly liable in trespass and subject to an injunction to cease the activity where another 
defendant who emits particles that are 0.03mm in size should be liable only if the particles 
unreasonably interfere with  a plaintiff’s use of her land? 137 We seem to be drawing really, 
really fine lines here. The visible-to-the-naked-eye standard fails because, in setting a nor-
mative standard through an empirical category, it forgets our lesson that property is not 
physics, and in so doing, adds an unacceptable degree of arbitrariness to the test (why does 
the 0.03mm defendant get the benefit of a reasonability test that the 0.06mm defendant 
does not). 
Instead we might think that the presence of the reasonability requirement in nuisance 
is not just an implication of the difference between nuisance and trespass but also explan-
atory of it. That is, the difference between nuisance and trespass can be understood simply 
by saying that a nuisance is the kind of activity committed by a defendant which interferes 
with a plaintiff’s normative control with respect to her property and thus infringes her right 
only if it is unreasonable; a trespass, by contrast, is the kind of activity that always infringes 
a plaintiff’s right. We might say this more quickly, if somewhat imprecisely, by saying 
that trespasses are always unreasonable, whereas the unreasonability of a nuisance is a 
matter of the circumstances of the case (as it was put in Sturges): how loud?  what smell? 
and so on.138 As I said above, both nuisances and trespasses infringe the same right of 
owners—the right to determine how others act with respect to their land—but that tres-
passes involve those kinds of actions which always infringe, whereas nuisance involves 
actions whose infringement is a matter of the reasonability analysis. If we understand this 
right to be justified, as I argue we should, by owner’s normative interest in being in control 
                                                          
Rights 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 27-30 (1985). 
 136. Merrill, supra note 135, at 27-30. Merrill actually locates four distinctions, but rejects two others as im-
plausible and does not discuss them in detail; one holds that trespasses take place on plaintiff’s land while nui-
sances take place on defendant’s land, but this was abandoned with the assize of nuisance’s replacement by the 
action on the case; the other holds that a trespass is like a nuisance serious enough to rise to the level of dispos-
session, but this is hard to square with the law in that trespass does not even remotely require anything like 
dispossession. 
 137. Apparently, a human with good vision can discern particles that are about 0.04mm in diameter.Yan Wong, 
How small can the naked eye see? SCIENCE FOCUS, http://www.sciencefocus.com/qa/how-small-can-naked-eye-
see. 
 138. Putting basically this point conversely, James Penner, suggests, I think correctly, that very severe nui-
sances—“poisoning the atmosphere so that the occupier is faced with the alternatives of death or flight”—amount 
to something similar to what is usually actionable in trespass (or ejectment). See Penner, supra note 81, at 20. 
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of others in order to have some property as a normative refuge, this makes sense; it is hard 
to understand how I could be in charge of you with respect to some land if you could enter 
it without my permission, but me being in charge of you with respect to the land must be 
part of a rightful system, and so, it extends to giving me a right over other actions of yours 
(in particular those that you commit on your own land; more on this in a moment) only 
when they generate an unreasonable interference. 
This understanding of the nuisance-trespass divide also explains the historically 
most prominent line of division between the torts, namely the direct vs. indirect test (which 
Merrill rejects as too unclear).139 It still is plausibly said to be the line of division in Eng-
land and Canada. The leading commonwealth case is Mann v. Saulnier,140 a case about a 
fence on a defendant’s land which over time began to lean over a plaintiff’s land. The court 
held that the defendant could not be liable in trespass, since the leaning of the fence was 
not a result of any direct action by the defendant.141 This distinction between trespass and 
nuisance in terms of the difference between direct and indirect invasions ‘accords with an 
orthodox understanding of both torts’142 and, as Winfield notes, is consistent with the his-
torical division between them.143 
The thought here is that to act in a way that directly interferes with a plaintiff’s 
interpersonal normative control with respect to her land—to enter her land without her 
permission—is inconsistent with her normative interest in controlling others’ actions with 
respect to the land, and so, it infringes her right in the land regardless of any effects. In 
other words, trespass. But to act in a way which indirectly or consequentially interferes—
to commit something like a nuisance—might not be inconsistent with plaintiff’s normative 
interest, especially when we keep in mind that this interest must be realized through a 
                                                          
 139. Incidentally, it also explains Merrill’s own preferred test: smaller particles will tend not to interfere with 
plaintiff’s normative control over others’ actions with respect to her land in the way that larger ones will. (If there 
is a house-sized rock on my land then I cannot put a house there, but if there is a lot of dust—i.e. a lot of really 
really small rocks—I still can.) Given this plausible idea, we might draw some lines at, e.g., visibility to the 
naked eye, but clearly the work is being done by the normative idea of reasonability for which the empirical 
category is merely an imperfect proxy which has no normative significance of its own. Notably, Merrill, supra, 
at 33, considers and rejects a test of ‘substantiality’ for size of particular emissions. This test seems preferable in 
that it allows the empirical category to better track the underlying normative concern, but Merrill rejects it for its 
information costliness. 
 140. Mann v Saulnier, (1959) 19 DLR (2d) 130 (NBSC). See also the discussion in MURPHY, supra note 132, 
at 17-20.  
 141. The court relied on a well-known passage from Salmond: “It is a trespass, and therefore actionable per 
se, directly to place material objects upon another’s land; it is not a trespass, but at the most a nuisance or other 
wrong actionable only on proof of damage, to do an act which consequentially results in the entry of such objects. 
To throw stones upon one’s neighbor’s premises is the wrong of trespass; to allow stones from a ruinous chimney 
to fall upon those premises is the wrong of nuisance.” SALMOND ON TORTS 160-1 (12th ed.) cited in Mann v 
Saulnier, 19 DLR (2d) at para 8. Of course, this is a blurry line, and the law is consistent with this blurriness: the 
court in Mann, having said that the fence’s overhanging could not be a trespass because it was indirect (or unin-
tentional), went on to find that defendant was not liable in nuisance, either, since the overhanging fence caused 
no harm to plaintiff. But a contemporary comment criticized this second part of the decision on the grounds that 
‘when artificial projections have been treated as nuisances the courts have been ready to presume damages.’ See 
Hudson, supra note 135, at 189. Surely, this must be correct. A permanent incursion of a tangible physical object 
onto an owner’s land deprives the owner of the kind of control that the law of property says they should have: it 
is not clear what it would mean for me to own land if I had no right to prevent permanent incursions onto it. Such 
a presumption of damage, of course, means that such nuisances end up being treated a lot like trespasses (i.e. 
they are pretty much actionable per se). On the analysis offered here, that makes perfect sense.  
 142. MURPHY, supra note 132, at 19. 
 143. Winfield, supra note 135, at 202-03. 
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system of ownership rights. Thus, only when these indirect effects are unreasonable, is 
plaintiff’s right violated. In other words, nuisance.144 
B. The Objective Standard 
On the account I offer here, it is easy to see why there can be no liability in nuisance 
for harms which arise only because of some peculiar sensitivity of the plaintiff or her land. 
Start with the latter case. The law is that it would “be wrong to say that the doing something 
not in itself noxious is a nuisance, because it does harm to some particular trade in the 
adjoining property, although it would not prejudicially affect any ordinary trade carried on 
there, and does not interfere with the ordinary enjoyment of life.”145 It is easy to see why: 
terms of interaction which allowed one owner to control the conduct of others, because it 
interfered with his use of his own land even though it would not interfere with anyone 
else’s use of their land would give that particular owner a kind of control over others that 
could not be systematically realized. In spelling out a kind of a parallel argument in neg-
ligence law, Weinrib brings out the central abstract point:146 namely that what matters is 
that the terms of interaction between plaintiff and defendant must be set in a way that fully 
captures the role of each party in the interaction rather than depending on any feature of 
one or the other of them. The present point is that the objective standard in nuisance is a 
standard on which liability depends on features of a plaintiff and a defendant conceived of 
as doer and sufferer of the same (potential) wrong. In other words, in the basic case, each 
owner must have the same kind of rights against others as any other, and the mere fact that 
some individual owner chooses to use her property for some peculiar or particular purpose 
cannot give her additional claims (for non-interference) over others above and beyond 
those that any other owner has. Once this is accepted, it is easy to see that the same thing 
should be true for particularities, not just of the land or the use of the land, but also the 
owner herself. This idea is well-captured in the famous English case, Walter v. Selfe, where 
the court limited liability to “inconveniences materially interfering with the ordinary com-
fort physically of human existence, not merely according to elegant or dainty modes and 
                                                          
 144. This last point helps to see why some have thought that nuisance “regulates conflicts between owners of 
real property:” WEINRIB, supra note 21, at 191. The core doctrine of reasonability arises out of the recognition 
that property in land must be part of a system of rights which as a whole realizes the normative interest in control. 
While trespass can be committed by anyone (whether or not they own property), the activities that tend indirectly 
to interfere with owners’ control regarding their land must be activities which take place on someone else’s land. 
Thus, nuisances tend to be committed by other owners, and so nuisance can seem like it is fundamentally about 
relations between owners. But if a nuisance is just an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of 
land, it seems plausible to suppose that a nuisance could be committed by a non-owner defendant (for example 
a food-truck owner who parks on a public highway and emits sufficient noise or smells or smoke to substantially 
interfere with the homes located at the side of the road). This is a minor point, though. The crucial point is that, 
if we insist, we can distinguish trespass and nuisance doctrinally while maintaining, as we must, that they both 
protect the same core right of ownership. 
 145. Robinson v. Kilvert, [1888] 41 Ch. D. 88, 94. The point also extends to barring liability for damage 
resulting in some particular sensitivity of the land itself, as in Cremidas v. Fenton, 111 N.E. 855 (Mass. 1916), 
where vibrations which struck a very old building were not held to be a nuisance. 
 146. See WEINRIB, supra note 21, at 152 (showing how strict liability for accidental losses makes recovery 
turn on features of the plaintiff only whereas a subjective standard for such losses makes recovery turn on features 
of the defendant only, and how only the reasonability standard of negligence can adequately ground recovery on 
considerations common to both parties). 
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habits of living, but according to plain and sober and simple notions among the English 
people.”147 
The classic illustration of this is Rogers v. Elliot.148 In that case, plaintiff suffered 
from a medical condition which caused seizures whenever defendant’s church’s bells rang. 
The court denied recovery, holding that the reasonable standard for noise is set by its effect 
“upon people generally” rather than those with particularly low or high tolerances for 
noise. Again, the thought here is that a system of property rights must set the normative 
boundaries of ownership by reference to objective characteristics of the rights and the sys-
tem itself, rather than the particular features of any individual person. Obviously in a case 
like Rogers, this seems like a harsh result, but the grounds for this harshness—that the 
plaintiff here suffers from a disability whose effects defendant’s activity might be thought 
to worsen—are, to put it starkly, outside the realm of nuisance law, as plaintiff’s sensitivity 
is not something which defendant has any duty to see to, at least as a matter of nuisance 
law’s correlative structure.149 
C. Localities 
Let us turn again to Sturges. Here, Lord Justice Thesiger famously laid out the idea 
that the standard for nuisance liability might depend on where the land in question is phys-
ically located by contrasting two neighborhoods in London: “what would be a nuisance in 
Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in Bermondsey.”150 A bit of background 
might give us reason to worry about this idea. Wikipedia tells me that Belgrave Square 
(and its surrounding neighborhood Belgravia) is still one of the fancier parts of London 
(apparently “many embassies are based in the square.”).151 At the time of Sturges, Ber-
mondsey was an industrial district so, presumably, smellier, noisier, smokier, etc., than 
Belgravia. Today, however, it is apparently a cool place to live. According to the Guardian 
Newspaper, for instance, it is “quite the foodie mecca, with fancy lofts to match . . . .”152 
But before this gentrification happened, the distinction drawn in Sturges might be taken to 
have unacceptable socio-economic dimensions. Could nuisance law really allow that the 
rights of the rich are better than those of the poor?153 
Surely not. And in fact, it is easy to see why on the account I offer here. We begin 
with the basic idea that the tort protects against unreasonable interferences with the nor-
mative control that is distinctive of ownership, and then keep in mind the more abstract 
point made in Sturges, that “whether anything is a nuisance or not is a question to be 
determined, not merely by abstract consideration of the thing itself, but in reference to its 
                                                          
 147. Walter v. Selfe, [1851] E.R. 335 (U.K.). 
 148. Rogers v. Elliot, 15 N.E. 768, 771 (Mass. 1888). 
 149. Perhaps defendant had a moral duty to do something, as the court put it, “upon considerations of human-
ity.” But this kind of duty is not a nuisance duty; plaintiff’s right is not a property right. See BEEVER, supra note 
73, at 33-39, for more on this point and the objective standard in general. 
 150. Sturges v. Bridgman, [1879] 11 Ch. D. 852, 865 (U.K). 
 151. See Belgrave Square, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belgrave_Square. 
 152. Tom Dyckhoff, Let’s move to: Bermondsey, London SE1, GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/ 
money/2012/jan/13/bermondsey-london-se1-property-review. 
 153. Cf. BEEVER, supra note 73, at 31. 
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circumstances.”154 We can helpfully distinguish two types of “circumstances” that matter 
here. 
First, we need to keep in mind that nuisance liability is correlatively structured. 
Thus, plaintiff’s claim is and must always be that defendant’s activity created an unrea-
sonable interference and infringed her right. Yet, some core classes of nuisance are con-
stituted by physical activities whose effects are cumulative. In an industrial area, therefore, 
a plaintiff might be subjected to a very significant degree of (say) smoke, because each of 
her neighbors emits a small (that is, reasonable) amount of smoke, but all this smoke to-
gether adds up to an amount of smoke which we might otherwise think plaintiff ought not 
reasonably need to put up with. Plaintiff’s problem here—that is, the reason she can’t suc-
ceed in nuisance—is that the claim must be that some individual defendant caused this 
unreasonable interference, since, again, liability is correlative and plaintiff cannot succeed 
in nuisance based on an argument entirely about her suffering, however significant. That 
is why, first, the court in Sturges says, “where a locality is devoted to a particular trade or 
manufacture carried on . . . [in a manner] not constituting a public nuisance,” the trade 
itself might not be a nuisance;155 but, second, other courts have reminded us that this prin-
ciple has limits and that, even in a noisy neighborhood, “fresh noise” might nevertheless 
constitute a nuisance.156 
The other kind of circumstance that is relevant is the actual physical features of the 
properties in question. Here again, the correlativity point is relevant: remember that the 
reasonability standard in nuisance requires that courts set terms of interaction between a 
plaintiff and a defendant that are reasonable and fair as between them, given all the cir-
cumstances of the case. When Lord Halsbury said that, “A dweller in towns cannot expect 
to have as pure air, as free from smoke, smell, and noise as if he lived in the country, and 
distant from other dwellings,”157 we can understand him to mean something like the fol-
lowing. If plaintiff and defendant live very close to each other, then the amount of (say) 
noise that defendant needs to make on his property to cause plaintiff to hear the noise at 
level L is less than the amount of noise that defendant would need to make on his property 
for plaintiff to hear the noise at that same level were defendant and plaintiff to live, as Lord 
Halsbury put it, “in the county, and distant from” each other.158 The actual physical cir-
cumstances here have an impact on the way in which defendant’s activities affect plaintiff. 
                                                          
 154. Sturges, 11 Ch. D. at 865. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Rushmer v. Polsue & Alfieri Ltd., [1906] 1 Ch. 234, 250-51 (“It was strenuously contended . . . that 
a person living in a district specially devoted to a particular trade cannot complain of any nuisance by noise 
caused by the carrying on of any branch of that trade without carelessness and in a reasonable manner. I cannot 
assent to this argument. A resident in such a neighbourhood must put up with a certain amount of noise. The 
standard of comfort differs according to the situation of the property and the class of people who inhabit it . . . But 
whatever the standard of comfort in a particular district may be, I think the addition of a fresh noise caused by 
the defendant’s works may be so substantial as to create a legal nuisance. It does not follow that because I live, 
say, in the manufacturing part of Sheffield I cannot complain if a steam-hammer is introduced next door, and so 
worked as to render sleep at night almost impossible, although previously to its introduction my house was a 
reasonably comfortable abode, having regard to the local standard; and it would be no answer to say that the 
steam-hammer is of the most modern approved pattern and is reasonably worked. In short, if a substantial addi-
tion is found as a fact in any particular case, it is no answer to say that the neighbourhood is noisy, and that the 
defendant’s machinery is of first-class character.”). 
 157. Colls v. Home Colonial Stores Ltd., [1904] A.C. 179, 185. 
 158. See BEEVER, supra note 73, at 31-32 
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Plaintiff cannot demand, though, that defendant bear the burden of these changed circum-
stances (and thus, keep her noise down to ensure plaintiff only hears what she would hear 
if they lived further apart) as that would not be fair terms of interaction between plaintiff 
and defendant; of course, neither can defendant demand that, notwithstanding how close 
she lives to plaintiff, she be allowed to make noise at the same level as would cause plain-
tiff to hear noise at level L were they to live in much farther apart. That is just what it 
means to say that what is reasonable as between plaintiff and defendant must take into 
account all of the circumstances. 
Noise might be an easy case. More difficult and contentious applications of this idea 
would involve a broader investigation into the physical circumstances of the land in ques-
tion. One example might be rules involving surface water. As is well-known, there are 
several different kinds of rules for nuisance liability arising from events involving surface 
water. The suggestion— which I do not have the space to develop here— would be that 
the kind of normative control over one’s land that nuisance protects might have different 
implications in different localities depending on their physical circumstances involving 
water; in some places surface water is deemed a common enemy and owners are allowed 
to redirect it as they wish,159 whereas in others, it must be allowed to flow freely through 
natural paths of drainage.160 A few jurisdictions even apply the common enemy rule in 
urban settings and the civil law rule in rural ones.161 
D. Coming to a Nuisance 
A final aspect of Sturges v. Bridgman, beyond those I have already mentioned, is the 
question of priority in time: how can a plaintiff stop a defendant’s confectioneering when 
a defendant has been carrying this activity on for such a long time? The court holds that a 
defendant’s historical use simply does not matter in establishing nuisance liability. If we 
are to understand a defendant’s activity as the kind of thing that a plaintiff has a right that 
a defendant cease, it simply cannot matter that a defendant has been doing this activity 
already.162 The fact that you have been battering me does not even plausibly seem to give 
you a right to continue battering me. If anything it gives me a right that you make up for 
the battering you have already done.163 This is sometimes thought to be unjust, on the 
grounds that it seems to allow a plaintiff to move in next to some unpleasant activity that 
                                                          
 159. A modified version of the common enemy rule is still used in Indiana: Crowel v. Marshall Cnty. Drainage 
Bd., 971 N.E. 2d 638 (Ind. 2012); see Argyelan v. Haviland, 435 N.E. 2d 973 (Ind. 1982), for a more lengthy 
analysis discussing the common enemy and civil law rules; see also Kurpiel v. Hicks, 731 S.E. 2d 921 (Va. 
2012), for a watered-down version of the common enemy rule that adds a reasonableness standard. 
 160. This doctrine is called the ‘civil law rule’. It is applied in Alberta: Makowecki v. Yachimyc, [1917] 34 
D.L.R. 130 (Can. Alta. S.C.). In Illinois, the civil law rule is still applied but with exceptions for husbandry. See 
Victor Township Drainage Dist. 1 v. Lundeen Family Farm P’ship, 19 N.E. 3d 652 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); see also 
Jennifer S. Graham, The Reasonable Use Rule in Surface Water Law, 57 MO. L. REV. 223, 232 (1992), for an 
overview of American jurisdictions that follow the common law and civil law rules. 
 161. In Alabama, the civil law rule governs surface waters in rural settings, whereas the ‘common enemy’ rule 
is used in cities, towns and village lots: Dekle v. Vann, 182 So. 2d 885 (Ala. 1966). In Kansas, the common 
enemy rule is applied within the incorporated limits of a city, whilst the civil law rule is applied outside of cities. 
See Goering v. Schrag, 207 P. 2d 391 (Kan. 1949).  
 162. Subject of course to the possibility that defendant has been doing it long enough to get an easement, as 
discussed in supra, Part 3.A 
 163. See Arthur Ripstein, As If It Had Never Happened, 48 WM. & M. L. REV. 1857 (2007). 
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he knows about and then bring an action to stop it. But as the court noted in Sturges, 
potential defendants in cases, such as these, have an option to prevent results such as this; 
discussing an imagined case of “a blacksmith’s forge built away from all habitations, but 
to which, in the course of time, habitations approach,” the court tells us that the blacksmith 
“might protect himself by taking sufficient curtilage to ensure what he does from being at 
any time any annoyance to his neighbor . . . .”164 If the blacksmith failed to do this, it 
seems as though it would be fair to ask him why he expects the law to do it for him.165 
E. Remedies 
Historically, the remedy for a nuisance is an injunction.166 This remedy squares best 
with the theory of nuisance offered here: if a nuisance is an action that an owner has the 
right that others not perform, then the remedy most consistent with that is an injunction to 
stop the activity and uphold the original right. Nuisance is fundamentally a matter of 
boundary-crossing, just like trespass, except that the boundary crossed is a normative one. 
We are far from the law of negligence here where damages are the most obvious remedy 
since, e.g., spilled milk cannot be drunk. It is no surprise that injunctive relief has histori-
cally been relatively easy for successful plaintiffs to obtain. 
That all changed, though, with the decision in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. In that 
case, the court famously held that a nuisance could be compensated by “permanent dam-
ages to plaintiffs which would compensate them for the total economic loss to their prop-
erty . . . ,”167 on the grounds that such damages would “be a reasonable effective spur to 
research for improved techniques to minimize nuisance.”168 This, of course, ignores the 
central correlativity of nuisance liability and conditions the remedy entirely on the status 
of defendants. Moreover, the dissent, in rejecting this result, depicts its central flaw in a 
way that is perfectly consistent with the argument offered here. According to the dissent, 
the damage award amounts to “licensing a continuing wrong.”169 If, as I am arguing, nui-
sance is a crossing of a normative boundary, allowing a damage award for a nuisance is 
equivalent to allowing defendants to force plaintiffs to allow trespasses upon payment of 
some fee or, more tendentiously, allowing defendants to force plaintiffs to allow batteries 
upon payment of some fee.170 The traditional injunctive approach is to be preferred. (This 
is not to say that damages for past loss should be unavailable.) However much some econ-
omists think this is all a matter of efficiency that is worked out on a spreadsheet,171 it 
should be clear that to allow for damage awards in nuisance cases simply makes a mockery 
                                                          
 164. Sturges v. Bridgman, [1879] 11 Ch. D. 852, 865 (U.K). 
 165. See Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co. Inc. v. Taylor, (1937), 58 CLR 479 (Austl.) (“In my 
opinion, the law cannot by an injunction in effect erect fences which the plaintiff is not prepared to provide.”). 
See also Chapter 6 of BEEVER, supra note 73, for a detailed discussion of coming to nuisance  
 166. Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting, [1895], 1 Ch. 287 (U.K.). 
 167. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 225 (1970). As an aside, note that the court treated the 
damages as the price to purchase an easement on plaintiffs’ land, confirming the suggestions made at the start of 
supra Part 3.A 
 168. Id. at 226. 
 169. Id. at 230. 
 170. For an attempt to defend Boomer on rights-based grounds, see Gregory C. Keating, Nuisance as a Strict 
Liability Wrong, 4(3) J. TORT L. ARTICLE 2. As he must, Keating attempts to draw a sharp line between trespass 
and nuisance. See id. at 6 n.13, 8-9 n.19.  
 171. Of course, I am thinking about Calabresi and Melamed. 
34
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 52 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol52/iss1/4
ESSERT_FINAUTH_11-30 (DO NOT DELETE)  
2016] NUISANCE AND THE NORMATIVE BOUNDARIES 119 
of the idea that owners are owners, that is, that they have a right that others not act in 
certain ways with respect to their property. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Nuisance, as a tort against land, is distinctively tied to the justification of property 
in land: a plaintiff owner who suffers a nuisance has suffered an infringement of rights that 
she has distinctively in her capacity as owner. Ownership is justified because the kind of 
interpersonal normative control that defines ownership is itself valuable: it is a good thing 
that we are able to have rights-based relationships with one another. Nuisances are wrongs 
because to suffer a nuisance is to suffer an infringement of this valuable right. But the 
nature of the value does not fully determine what counts as an infringement (as a nuisance) 
a priori. Rather the practice of the law of nuisance—the application of practical judgment 
by actual judges deciding actual cases – determines what counts as a wrong and so partially 
constitutes the nature of the right. Thus, nuisance sets the normative boundaries of owner-
ship. 
One element of the account I have offered here which I have not had a chance to 
discuss is this: it provides us with a framework to think about the potential to expand nui-
sance in various different directions. Once we see that what nuisance is about is protecting 
the rights of owners and, at the same time, partially constituting those rights, we can see 
that, first, we might gain insight into controversial and difficult nuisance cases from the 
idea that property rights (and thus nuisance) are about protecting owners’ normative ref-
uge. Nuisance is a tort that is, increasingly, being looked at as a potential private law rem-
edy for certain kinds of environmental wrongs.172 Second, we might gain insight into the 
nature of ownership and property rights from asking what kinds of situations of nuisance 
might count as infringing such rights. Does the account of ownership that nuisance law 
seems to reveal tell us anything about the relationship between ownership and zoning con-
trols?173 What about the normative boundaries of ownership in a democratic society?  
Could owners prevent political canvassers from approaching them? What amount of dis-
tance from other owners can we insist on in a democratic state?  These questions and others 
are not answered by the account I have offered here. But that account does provide us with 
a framework to think about them, by seeing how there are problems about nuisance and 
(what is the same thing) about ownership. The point can be generalized. 
In his important recent treatment of nuisance, Allan Beever denies that understand-
ing nuisance requires a theory of property and ownership.174 Given that nuisance is a tort 
against land, that the right protected by nuisance is the core right of ownership, and that 
the law of nuisance partially constitutes that right by setting its normative boundaries, 
Beever gets things precisely backwards. Understanding property requires understanding 
                                                          
 172. See George P. Smith II & David M. Steenburg, Environmental Hedonism or, Securing the Environment 
Through the Common Law, 40 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 65 (2015); Kaoru Suzuki, The Role of 
Nuisance Law in the Developing Common Law of Hydraulic Fracturing, 41 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 265 
(2014). 
 173. On which the classic treatment, although located within the law and economics framework that I have 
insisted must be rejected, is Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines 
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 683 (1973). 
 174. BEEVER, supra note 73, at 24. 
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nuisance, and understanding nuisance requires understanding property. Hopefully, the 
foregoing has, to some small degree, advanced us on these tasks. 
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